The Role of Private Sector Investment in International Microfinance and the Implications of Domestic Regulatory Environments by Langer, William
Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 2
12-20-2008
The Role of Private Sector Investment in
International Microfinance and the Implications of
Domestic Regulatory Environments
William Langer
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
and the International Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Langer, The Role of Private Sector Investment in International Microfinance and the Implications of Domestic Regulatory
Environments, 5 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 1 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol5/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
1 
The Role of Private Sector Investment in 
International Microfinance and the Implications of 
Domestic Regulatory Environments 
William Langer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance is the practice of providing small, working capital 
loans and other financial services to individuals unable to obtain 
access to commercial sources of credit. Microfinance has transformed 
the lives of over 100 million micro-entrepreneurs throughout the 
world. Modern microfinance began in the mid-1970s with initiatives, 
first in Bangladesh and then in Bolivia, to distribute small loans to 
the working poor.1 These ventures demonstrated both the 
sustainability of microfinance through loan repayment rates of nearly 
100%2 and the effectiveness of microfinance as a poverty-alleviation 
tool.3 Building on these initial successes, the microfinance industry 
has grown to an estimated 10,000 lending institutions,4 
approximately $22 billion in total assets, and a client base of over 
 
* Associate, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., 
Columbia University. The author would like to thank Jim Kaddaras and Developing World 
Markets for providing guidance and the opportunity to work on this issue, and without whose 
support in research and editing this article would not have been possible. 
 1. MICROCAPITAL INSTITUTE, MANAGING COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE: THE 
PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS BEHIND THE ASSET CLASS 1 (2004) [hereinafter MANAGING 
COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE], available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/ 
45828_file_19.pdf. 
 2. Sylvie Golay & Ursula Oser, Microfinance as an Attractive Business Model, CREDIT 
SUISSE: GLOBAL INVESTOR FOCUS, May 2005, at 17. While variation exists, mature lending 
institutions experience repayment rates of 98%. Id. In the solidarity model of microfinance, 
social collateral is leveraged by grouping borrowers; where a group member defaults on an 
installment, the remaining members are jointly liable for the loss. Klaus Tischhauser, Ecuador: 
The Market, Credit Systems and Clients, CREDIT SUISSE: GLOBAL INVESTOR FOCUS, May 
2005, at 15. 
 3. Elizabeth Littlefield, et al., Is Microfinance an Effective Strategy to Reach the 
Millennium Development Goals?, 24 FOCUS NOTE 2 (2003). 
 4. MANAGING COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE, supra note 1, at 7. MicroCapital 
Institute, Grameen Foundation USA, and ACCION International all estimate a population of 
10,000 MFIs worldwide. Id.; JENNIFER MEEHAN, TAPPING THE FINANCIAL MARKETS FOR 
MICROFINANCE 1 (Grameen Foundation USA 2005), available at 
http://www.grameenfoundation.org/pubdownload/dl.php?pubID=4; Small Loans and Big 
Ambitions, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007, at 108. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
2 
100 million borrowers worldwide.5 While at least 90% of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) have yet to reach profitability, by 
2006 roughly 1,000 institutions had demonstrated profits through 
increased efficiency and scale.6 Profitability potential is shown by 
leading MFIs on various continents that outperform local 
commercial banks in terms of profitability.7 The number of profitable 
MFIs continues to increase due to the transformation of nonprofit 
MFIs into regulated, for-profit enterprises.8 
Despite its rapid growth, the microfinance industry currently 
reaches only a fraction of the estimated demand for microfinance 
services.9 Practitioners agree that to dramatically reduce world 
poverty and close the gap between supply and demand, microfinance 
institutions need to access funding from the private sector.10 Indeed, 
funds from philanthropic donations and public and multilateral 
development agencies are far from sufficient. 
The recent emergence of successful microfinance institutions, 
along with an increasing crop of wealthy and willing private 
investors, fosters optimism for the expansion of the microfinance 
industry. To date, relevant commentary has focused on the growth 
of the microfinance sector and its potential for continued 
expansion.11 Given the increasing interest on the part of investors, 
such commentary also discusses whether there will be so few of these 
 
 5. Elizabeth Nelson, What Are the Total Global Assets in Microfinance?, 
MICROCAPITAL, Oct. 31, 2007, available at http://www.microcapital.org/?p=1450. 
 6. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, BLENDED VALUE INVESTING: CAPITAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 62 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter 
BLENDED VALUE INVESTING]. 
 7. Tilman Ehrbeck, Optimizing Capital Supply in Support of Microfinance Industry 
Growth 5 (Omidyar Network & the SEEP Network, Working Paper, Oct. 2006). 
 8. ELISABETH RHYNE & BRIAN BUSCH, THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL 
MICROFINANCE: 2004–2006, at 10 (Sept. 2006). 
 9. The Shurush Initiative, Information on Microfinance, http://www.shurush.org/ 
economic/economic-background.html#2 (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The fraction of unmet 
demand for microfinance is in flux due to growth and changes in the industry. Charted data 
gathered by the Microfinance Summit Campaign in 2005 showed roughly 80% of demand 
unmet and forecasted a reduction to 72% of demand unmet by 2010. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., MEEHAN, supra note 4, at 1; BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, 
at 7; Guatam Ivatury & Xavier Reille, Foreign Investment in Microfinance: Debt and Equity 
from Quasi-Commercial Investors, 25 FOCUS NOTE 1 (Jan. 2004); MARC DE SOUSA-SHIELDS 
& CHERYL FRANKIEWICZ, FINANCING MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTEXT FOR 
TRANSITIONS TO PRIVATE CAPITAL, at vii (2004); Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 8. 
 11. See, e.g., MEEHAN, supra note 4; Rekha Reddy, Microfinance Cracking the Capital 
Markets II, 22 ACCION INSIGHT 1 (May 2007); Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 3; Guatam Ivatury 
& Julie Abrams, The Market for Foreign Investment in Microfinance: Opportunities and 
Challenges, 30 FOCUS NOTE 3 (Aug. 2005). 
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“investible” microfinance institutions that private capital will remain 
concentrated among a minority of exceptional institutions, leaving 
the microfinance sector as a whole unable to close the gap between 
supply and demand.12 
This Article seeks to contribute to the current understanding of 
the microfinance industry’s potential to address currently unmet 
demand for its services. The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, 
to assess the current supply and demand for commercial investment 
in microfinance; and second, to analyze some of the legal and 
regulatory challenges affecting the capacity of participating investors 
in the microfinance industry to satisfy unmet worldwide demand. In 
recent years, the increasing number of large, innovative transactions 
indicates that private investors are poised to supply as much capital as 
microfinance institutions can successfully and profitably deploy. 
This development could enable microfinance institutions to 
satisfy a vast portion of currently unmet worldwide demand for 
microfinance services. However, demand for private capital 
investment depends on more than potential client base. Such 
demand also largely depends on the ability of individual institutions 
to grow into profitable organizations that serve an expanded client 
base, making them attractive candidates to receive and deploy private 
capital investment. This Article concludes that domestic regulatory 
environments—often disjointed and ill suited to the relatively new 
microfinance industry—constitute one of the principal challenges 
that currently limit microfinance institutions’ ability to achieve the 
level of growth and profitability to make them “investible.” Thus, 
regulatory reform is crucial to the microfinance industry’s ability to 
attract investment, increase outreach, and ultimately close the gap 
between the supply and the demand for microfinance services. 
Part II of this Article assesses the level of supply and demand for 
commercial investment capital in microfinance institutions and 
examines whether there will be enough large microfinance 
institutions to attract and effectively deploy the amount of private 
capital that investors are able to provide. It discusses the current 
private sector involvement developed over the last several years to 
increase the supply of private capital, the creation of international 
investment vehicles to absorb private sector capital, and efforts to 
deliver increased financial services to micro-entrepreneurs. Part II 
 
 12. See, e.g., Ivatury & Abrams, supra note 11, at 11; Reddy, supra note 11, at 14. 
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also describes the growing demand for private investment in 
microfinance institutions. 
Part III addresses the regulatory challenges that the microfinance 
industry and participating private sector actors may face in meeting 
the demand for private capital. It then discusses the microfinance 
sectors within Brazil, China, and India, three countries representing 
over half of the unmet demand for microfinance.13 Each case study 
examines the country’s regulatory environment and analyzes the 
impact of regulations on the extent of microfinance outreach and 
potential for growth in each country. These assessments of the 
microfinance industry’s potential to operate successfully within 
specific regulatory regimes provide a deeper understanding of the 
industry’s overall potential to meet worldwide demand and suggest 
ways to improve efforts to fulfill that potential. 
II. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN 
MICROFINANCE 
While microfinance traditionally receives funding through 
government grants and non-profit subsidized loans, private investors 
have become increasingly interested in microfinance investment 
given the favorable financial and social returns. Indeed, building on 
initial investments in the 1990s, private commercial investment in 
microfinance began to grow at annual rates approximating 50% in 
the year 2000,14 reaching an estimated total of $2 billion invested by 
the end of 2006.15 Private investment is expected to gradually 
overtake funding from non-commercial and public sources.16 
Microfinance practitioners have welcomed the initial successes of 
private investment in microfinance, in part because the industry has 
been able to meet only a fraction of worldwide demand for 
microfinance services through traditional public funding sources.17 
Industry professionals agree that the funding necessary to close the 
gap between supply and demand must come from commercial 
 
 13. Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 2. 
 14. MANAGING COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 15. Xavier Reille & Ousa Sananikone, Microfinance Investment Vehicles, Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Brief, Apr. 2007, at 1. 
 16. Elisabeth Rhyne & María Otero, Microfinance Through the Next Decade: Visioning 
the Who, What, Where, When and How, ACCION INTERNATIONAL, 2006, at 45. 
 17. BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, at 8; see also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
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sources within the private capital markets.* Thus, private investment 
may be essential to fulfilling the original mission of microfinance—
namely, the provision of permanent access to financial services that 
enables large numbers of working poor to lift themselves out of 
poverty. This Part examines the growing role played by private 
capital investment in the microfinance industry. 
A. Current Private Sector Involvement: The Supply of Private Capital 
This Section first assesses the volume of investment from private 
sources. It then examines private investment as a portion of total 
worldwide microfinance investment, the rate at which private 
investment has expanded in recent years, the types of investors 
involved, and the various investment instruments developed to 
channel funds into microfinance. 
1. Microfinance investment vehicles and the supply of private capital 
Individual investors do make direct investments in MFIs; 
however, private investment in microfinance comes primarily from 
microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs)—microfinance funds that 
pool investor capital for investment in a number of MFIs. While 
some commercial investment in MFIs comes from the local markets, 
most initial investment comes from Western investors hoping to pave 
the way for local investors.19 MIV investment grew from $2 billion in 
200620 to an estimated $3.2 billion by the end of 2007.21 
Approximately 75% of this investment is debt, 22–25% is equity,22 
and 2% consists of guarantees for local investors.23 In terms of equity 
investment, 75% goes to Greenfield, for-profit institutions, and other 
young MFIs, demonstrating investor interest in funding start-up 
institutions that seek to eventually become large-scale profitable 
MFIs.24 
 
        18. See, e.g., MEEHAN, supra note 4; BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, at 7; 
Ivatury & Reille, supra note 10, at 1; DE SOUSA-SHIELDS & FRANKIEWICZ, supra note 10, at 
vii; Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 1. 
 19. Paul DiLeo & David FitzHerbert, The Investment Opportunity in Microfinance, 
GRASSROOTS CAP. MGMT., June 2007, at 17; MEEHAN, supra note 4, at 6. 
 20. Reille & Sananikone, supra note 15. 
 21. DEVELOPING WORLD MARKETS, MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY POTENTIAL (2007) 
(unpublished report on file with author). 
 22. Reddy, supra note 11, at 3. 
 23. Ivatury & Abrams, supra note 11, at 5; Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 4. 
 24. Reddy, supra note 11, at 3. 
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As of mid-2007 there were about eighty-five MIVs focused on 
investing in microfinance.25 These funds include a variety of debt- 
and equity-focused investments ranging from highly concessionary to 
purely commercial in their profit orientation.26 While new MIVs have 
recently entered the market, the supply is still heavily concentrated 
because the leading MIVs remain the most active.27 A 2005 study of 
seventy-four MIVs found that the top ten MIVs are responsible for 
65% of all MIV investment.28 ProCredit Holding AG, the largest of 
these funds, held $390.4 million in total capitalization, while sixty-
one of the seventy-four MIVs held less than $1 million.29 The 
subsections below discuss how MIVs fit into the larger picture of 
present and future microfinance funding. 
2. Private investment as a portion of total investment in microfinance 
Private foreign investment continues to represent a relatively 
small but fast-growing portion of the total investment in 
microfinance. A 2004 study found that domestic investment 
accounts for 76% of the total $17 billion invested in MFIs, with 60% 
of that domestic investment coming from deposits made by the 
borrowers or clients of the MFIs.30 The ability of MFIs to mobilize 
domestic deposits through savings is essential to the vitality of the 
microfinance industry, offering MFIs the lowest cost and most stable 
funding available,31 while also providing savings to clients.32 Despite 
the desirability of deposits as a source of funding, deposit-taking can 
be difficult to administer and is sometimes prohibited for certain 
MFIs under local legal regimes.33 Larger MFIs successfully engaged 
in deposit-taking require significant funds for liquidity and interest 
rate risk management,34 thus furthering the need for investment 
from private investors. 
 
 25. DiLeo & FitzHerbert, supra note 19, at 18. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Reddy, supra note 11, at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 3. 
 31. Marc de Sousa-Shields & Brad King, MFI Financing Strategies and the Transition to 
Private Capital, USAID: MicroReport #32, June 2005, at 1. 
 32. SAVINGS ARE AS IMPORTANT AS CREDIT: DEPOSIT SERVICES FOR THE POOR 1 
(CGAP Donor Brief No. 4, 2002), available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2435/DonorBrief_04.pdf. 
 33. See, e.g., de Sousa-Shields & King, supra note 31, at 13. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
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Excluding deposits, foreign investment comprises roughly 43% of 
total microfinance investment worldwide, or approximately $4 
billion.35 Within foreign investment, private investment from MIVs 
accounts for nearly half of the $4 billion currently invested.36 The 
majority of foreign investment currently comes from private MIV 
funds and essentially public International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), having invested $2 billion and $2.3 billion respectively by the 
end of 2006.37 This breakdown is somewhat misleading, however, 
because 36% of investment in MIVs currently comes from IFIs, 
which blurs the distinction between private and public funding.38 
3. The growth of private investment 
Private investment continues to show great potential for meeting 
microfinance capital demands. Indeed, private investment is poised 
to overtake public investment as the major source of microfinance 
funding, as evidenced by the recent growth of investment activity by 
MIVs. This would be a significant development given that public 
investment, largely from IFIs, was the only source of foreign funding 
until the 1990s. Evidence of this trend emerged in recent years as 
MIV investment has increased faster than IFI investment. While 
microfinance investment among IFIs more than doubled from $1 
billion in 2004 to $2.3 billion in 2006, MIV investment more than 
tripled over the same period, from $600 million to $2 billion.39 
Roughly forty new MIVs began operations from 2005 to 2007, 
nearly doubling their number.40 
While establishment of new MIVs increases, existing MIVs have 
expanded their investment activities. A 2006 study of fifty-four MIVs 
found that total assets increased from just under $1 billion in 2004 
to $1.45 billion in 2006, an increase of 47%.41 Investments increased 
 
 35. Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 3. 
 36. See id. The 43% is the percentage of foreign investment as a fraction of total 
“external” investment, where “external investment” is total investment (foreign and domestic, 
public and private), minus deposits, since deposits (clients’ savings) is an internal source. 
 37. Reille & Sananikone, supra note 15, at 1. 
 38. Ivatury & Abrams, supra note 11, at 4. 
 39. Reille & Sananikone, supra note 15, at 1. 
 40. Id. at 1; Julie Abrams & Damian von Stauffenberg, Role Reversal: Are Public 
Development Institutions Crowding Out Private Investment in Microfinance?, MICRORATE: 
MFINSIGHTS, Feb. 2007, at 4. 
 41. Microfinance Investment Vehicles: An Emerging Asset Class, MICRORATE: 
MFINSIGHTS, Nov. 2006, at 2. 
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91%, from $513 million in 2004 to $981 million in 2006.42 Thirty-
five of the fifty-four MIVs in the study were founded after 2000, 
suggesting that only twenty MIVs existed in 2000, compared to the 
eighty-five operating in 2007.43 Taken together, these figures 
indicate that an overwhelming majority of the $2 billion invested by 
the eighty-give MIVs has emerged over the last ten years. This 
growth suggests a rapidly increasing supply of capital at the disposal 
of MFIs. Indeed, Deutsche Bank has predicted that by the year 
2015, investment will increase tenfold, from the 2006 estimate of $2 
billion to $20 billion.44 
4. Investors in microfinance investment vehicles 
Investors in microfinance funds constitute a diverse group with 
varied profit orientation. MIVs invest not only in mature and 
profitable MFIs but also in start-ups and those undergoing 
transformation from unregulated nonprofit organizations to 
regulated profit-seeking banks; thus, there is a wide range in risk and 
profitability of potential investments. The nature of investment has 
four categories: (1) fully commercial, (2) blended value, (3) 
preservation of capital, and (4) grants.45 Commercial banks and 
institutional investors—including pension funds, private equity firms, 
and venture capital firms—typically engage in fully commercial 
investment, which seeks market-based, risk-adjusted returns. Funds 
of institutional investors earmarked for “socially responsible 
investment,” high net-worth individuals, and corporate social 
responsibility initiatives of commercial banks generally undertake 
blended value investment, which seeks commercial or near-
commercial gains and a substantial social return on investment. 
Foundations and IFIs engage in preservation of capital investment, 
which does not necessarily seek financial returns, and devote funding 
in the form of grants where no financial return is expected.46 
While initial MIV investment came from socially responsible 
investors and IFIs, private capital has shown an increased interest. 
Although engagement from the traditional capital markets is 
promising, purely commercial investment from mainstream 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. DEVELOPING WORLD MARKETS, supra note 21. 
 45. Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 3; BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, at YY, 5. 
 46. See Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 3; BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, at 5. 
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institutional investors still comprises only 17% of investment in 
MIVs.47 Of the remaining 83%, 47% comes from socially responsible 
investors, high net-worth individuals and foundations, and 36% 
comes from IFIs (down from an estimated 70% in 2004).48 Thus, 
MIVs have shown an increase in ability to attract non-public 
investment. 
5. Where private microfinance funds are invested 
The emergence of private investment has been driven by the 
investment potential of the leading MFIs in those regions of the 
world where the microfinance industry is most developed. As a 
result, investment has been concentrated both in the top MFIs and 
in those regions exhibiting the most vibrant microfinance sectors. In 
total, 450 to 500 MFIs receive investment from MIVs.49 However, 
just ten MFIs located in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central 
Asia currently absorb 26% of all MIV investment.50 
In general, MIV and IFI investment is heavily concentrated 
within the top fifty MFIs.51 These MFIs are licensed and regulated 
by local banking authorities, represent larger and more profitable 
institutions, and exhibit relatively less investment risk. This creates 
competition among private investors interested in investing in those 
“top tier” MFIs that exceed most MFIs in scale and profitability. At 
the same time, investment interest in “tier 2” and “tier 3” MFIs has 
been growing as investors become more familiar with microfinance 
and are able to pursue profitable investments in a broader class of 
institutions.52 
Some analysts argue that IFIs and government development 
banks crowd out private investment by continuing to invest in the 
most successful MFIs, and that these public investors should instead 
focus on funding the “next generation” of smaller but up-and-
coming MFIs in order to help them develop and eventually join the 
“tier 1”53 institutions.54 Public investment concentration among top 
 
 47. CGAP, GROWING INVESTMENT IN MICROFINANCE 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.3910/Portfolio_Jun2007.pdf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Reddy, supra note 11, at 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 8. 
 53. “Tier 1” institutions represent the top 2% among the most successful MFIs. The 
fragmentation of the MFI landscape into “tiers” of MFIs is discussed further in infra Part II.B. 
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MFIs is not altogether surprising. Most of the “tier 1” MFIs were 
relatively young and small institutions when IFI investment began, 
and it was this investment that helped them grow into “tier 1” MFIs. 
Thus, it may take time before IFIs exit their investments in these 
newly flourishing MFIs and start anew with investments directed 
toward the “next generation.” 
Nonetheless, as awareness of this issue spreads within the 
industry, IFIs and development agencies can be expected to deploy 
their more risk-tolerant capital to those small and growing MFIs that 
need it. This will open opportunity for private investment and 
generate a transition that should be influential in increasing the 
amount of MFIs able to profitably serve a large client-base. The 
amount of investible MFIs that can effectively absorb and produce a 
return on private funding—a small, albeit growing percentage—is 
decisive in determining the amount of capital that investors are able 
to commit to microfinance. This is further discussed in Part II, 
Section B of this Article. 
Finally, due to concentration of the top MFIs, private investment 
in microfinance is funneled into regions where the microfinance 
sector is most developed. To date, 42% of MIV investment occurs in 
Latin America and the Caribbean while 39% occurs in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.55 This leaves only 20% of investment going 
to East and South Asia and Africa, which contain a great portion of 
the world’s poor and where microfinance development lags behind 
that of Latin America and Eastern Europe.56 As the microfinance 
sector continues to develop in these regions and MFIs become more 
established, increased private capital investment should follow. 
6. Investment instruments used by microfinance investment vehicles 
In the last several years, innovative investment strategies have 
emerged to channel private capital into microfinance. Relatively new 
investment structures include holding companies, equity funds, 
country level funds, and funds of funds. In addition, some funders 
offer local currency products to mitigate foreign exchange risk and 
currency-linked products. This subsection outlines the various 
innovations in investment instruments that MIVs have recently 
begun to pursue. 
 
 54. Abrams & von Stauffenberg, supra note 40, at 1. 
 55. Reddy, supra note 11, at 3. 
 56. RHYNE & BUSCH, supra note 8, at 12. 
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a. Credit guarantees and enhancements. Loan guarantees, also 
known as credit enhancements, have been prevalent in international 
development for decades and have been a part of the microfinance 
industry since the mid-1980s. Guarantees in microfinance encourage 
local investors and banks to lend to MFIs where they might have 
otherwise been deterred by the perceived risk. This is accomplished 
through an international bank issuing a standby letter of credit or 
credit enhancement to the local bank, whereby the international 
bank promises to pay the local bank if the MFI defaults on its debt. 
The international bank’s commitment is typically guaranteed by a 
foreign investor who pledges its own assets to the international bank 
in the event that the MFI defaults. 
Such guarantees are most helpful where they cause the investor 
community to reassess its perception of the risk of MFIs. An MFI’s 
timely repayment of its loans can pave the way for additional 
transactions that do not require guarantees. This would enable MFIs 
to broaden their investor base as microfinance investment is shown 
to be less risky than initially believed.57 Although a 2006 study found 
an increase in the use of guarantees, this increase primarily came 
from IFIs and other development agencies.58 Indeed, a 2005 study 
found that IFI investment makes up 90% of the funding directed 
towards guarantees with MIVs accounting for the remaining 10%.59 
Guarantees effectively stimulate domestic markets for investment in 
microfinance and channel external funds into microfinance where 
regulations cap foreign funding. 
b. Private equity investment. Private equity investment can be 
especially useful for start-up MFIs that, according to their business 
plans, typically operate at a loss for their first few years and thus are 
unlikely candidates for debt investment. In addition, MIVs with 
industry experience can help disseminate best practices, technological 
innovation, and organizational capacity building among their 
investments. The first commercial microfinance equity fund, 
ProFund, founded in 1995, exited its investment and distributed 
profits to its investors in 2005.60 The success of ProFund, the only 
 
 57. Ann Miles, Financial Intermediation and Integration of Regulated MFIs, in 11 
MICROBANKING BULL. 9, 11 (Didier Thys, ed., Aug. 2005). 
 58. Alexia Latortue et al., Managing the Floodgates? Making the Most of the International 
Flows of Microfinance Funding, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (2006), at 14. 
 59. Ivatury & Abrams, supra note 11, at 5. 
 60. BLENDED VALUE INVESTING, supra note 6, at 45. 
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fund of its kind in the mid-1990s, stimulated private equity interest 
in microfinance.61 By 2006 at least seventeen commercially-oriented, 
equity-focused MIVs had emerged.62 
The first half of 2007 saw two major private equity 
investments—both in Indian MFIs— that are expected to further 
this trend. The first of these transactions was conducted by Sequoia 
Capital, a venture capital company known for early investments in 
Google and YouTube, which invested $11.5 million in the MFI SKS. 
Two months later, Legatum, a private company that focuses on a 
blend of financial and social returns, invested $25 million in Share 
Microfin Limited, completing the largest private equity investment 
in a single MFI as of July 2007.63 
c. Bond issues in microfinance institutions. Bond issues began in 
2001 with a $2 million issue by Colombian MFI Financiera América 
(Finamerica). By 2005, MFIs in Africa and Eastern Europe had also 
issued bonds.64 Bond offerings are not linked directly to any 
individual MFI loans, but are rather structured as obligations of 
MFIs themselves. The borrowers’ repayment of interest and principal 
on the microloans back the bond offerings. Through this 
arrangement, the holder of the bonds absorbs the balance sheet risk 
of the MFI. Aggregately, MFIs in Latin America had placed over 
$100 million in bonds in their local capital markets by 2005, and 
more MFIs in other regions are expected to continue this trend.65 
Indeed, microfinance bond offerings have grown from Finamerica’s 
pioneer transaction of $2 million in 2001 to transactions ranging 
from $7 million to $52 million in 2005.66 
The success of these transactions has also stimulated investment 
interest from a growing variety of mainstream investors. Three bond 
issues made between 2002 and 2004 by Peruvian MFI MiBanco 
exemplify this trend. The first, in September 2002, was facilitated by 
a 50% guarantee from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). The second, in September 2003, was again 
 
 61. DiLeo & FitzHerbert, supra note 19, at 18. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Gil Crawford & Lauren Clark, Capital Markets: A Long-Term Solution to Financial 
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guaranteed at 50%; however this time from a regional bank and at a 
lower rate of interest than the 2002 transaction. The third was 
completed in October 2003 without a guarantee because the 
previous two had established MiBanco as an attractive investment. 
Furthermore, while investment in the first issuing came 
predominantly from pension funds, investments in the second and 
third issues were more evenly distributed between mutual funds, 
public entities, pension funds, banks, and insurance companies.67 
d. Securitizations. Securitizations in microfinance come primarily 
in the form of international collateralized debt obligations. This is 
structured through the establishment of a special purpose vehicle, 
which issues securities to investors and then uses the proceeds to 
make loans to a group of MFIs. The underlying microloans of several 
MFIs are then pledged as collateral to investors. The pooling of the 
underlying loans of a group of MFIs diversifies investment and 
spreads risk and increases the scale of the investment, making these 
transactions more appealing than investment in a single MFI. The 
first microfinance securitizations occurred in 2004 and 2005, with 
transactions of $40 million and $47 million, respectively, completed 
jointly by Developing World Markets (an American investment 
company) and BlueOrchard (a Swiss investment company).68 
Although microfinance securitization is still in its nascent stage, 
some groundbreaking transactions suggest a promising future. Two 
of the largest transactions to date were completed jointly by the 
international investment bank Morgan Stanley and the MIV 
BlueOrchard with issues of $106 million in March 2006 and $108 
million in May 2007.69 The 2007 transaction, rated by Standard & 
Poor’s, was able to channel funds to twenty-one MFIs in thirteen 
countries.70 This demonstrates that while Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, and Central Asia remain the most developed regions for 
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microfinance, investors have begun to find investible MFIs in Africa 
and Southeast Asia. Although such large transactions are still not 
applicable to most MFIs, they will likely become more prevalent as 
more large-scale MFIs emerge and as investors continue to pursue 
innovative transactions that increase investment options. Indeed, 
recent securitizations have already demonstrated an ability to move 
from the “tier 1” MFIs to small MFIs still in their maturing stage.71 
However, the economic and financial events of 2008 highlighted 
risks inherent in securitizations of risky or overvalued assets. It is 
essential to recognize the susceptibility of MFIs to speculation and 
the need for accurate risk assessments if securitization is to benefit 
rather than harm MFIs. As noted above, securitization helps MFIs 
because individual MFIs cannot take on loans large enough to attract 
commercial investors with large amounts of capital to invest. 
Securitization can thus allow for a series of loans to a group of MFIs, 
aggregating a series of transactions, all of which would be too small 
individually to be attractive to investors holding large amounts of 
capital. While smaller investors could theoretically provide the 
individual loans, this would diminish individual MFIs’ prospects for 
attracting investment. In addition, most of these smaller investors are 
increasingly placing their capital in the hands of large investors, 
namely institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, and mutual funds. 
e. Initial public offerings. Use of the initial public offering (IPO), 
or first sale of stock by a company to the public, emerged in the 
microfinance industry in 2003 when the MFI Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
was listed on the Jakarta, Singapore, and other stock exchanges.72 In 
2006, Equity Bank of Kenya listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.73 
In April 2007, Banco Compartamos of Mexico listed on the Mexican 
Stock Exchange.74 Proceeds from the Compartamos IPO totaled 
$486 million, with purchases emanating from 5,920 institutional and 
retail investors from Mexico, the United States, Europe, and South 
America.75 While these three MFIs represent industry leaders, 
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practitioners believe that an increasing number of MFIs are 
exhibiting the scale, growth, and profitability sufficient to pursue an 
IPO.76 
Furthermore, the Compartamos IPO was a secondary offering in 
which all of the shares were sold by existing investors.77 Many of 
these investors wished to exit their investment in the extremely 
successful MFI and reinvest in start-up initiatives.78 Their ability to 
sell their shares demonstrates the increasing liquidity of microfinance 
assets as microfinance investment draws interest from an increasingly 
broad class of private investors. Thus, although Compartamos did 
not yield profits from this offering, the liquidity of microfinance 
assets demonstrated by the transaction should increase investor 
confidence and general interest in microfinance investment. 
f. Syndication. While syndicated loans are common in 
mainstream commercial banking, bilateral loan transactions 
exclusively characterized the microfinance industry. However, in 
December 2006, three independent American MIVs (MicroVest, the 
Calvert Social Investment Foundation, and the Dignity Fund) 
completed a syndicated loan to D-MIRO, an MFI in Ecuador.79 
These joint transactions saved time and expenses for both the MFIs 
and the MIVs largely by combining the due diligence and other 
administrative efforts between MIVs, thus increasing profitability for 
MFIs. 
g. Mezzanine funds. In 2005, a group of institutional investors 
and IFIs established the Global Commercial Microfinance 
Consortium.80 The capital structure of this mezzanine fund consists 
of senior debt, sub-debt, equity, and grant capital. Deutsche Bank 
and Merrill Lynch are among those who manage the fund.81 It allows 
different types of private and public investors to pool their funding 
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and take more or less risky positions depending on their profit 
orientations. The IFI partners, such as USAID, occupy the riskiest 
positions while institutional investors, such as pension funds and 
individual investors, occupy less risky positions.82 To date, the fund 
has approved $80.6 million for investment in MFIs across twenty-
one countries.83 
These innovative investment strategies have increased the 
channels available to private investors. Along with the development 
of MFIs in currently under-serviced parts of the world, these new 
investment instruments should further increase the supply of private 
investment in microfinance. Overall, private investment in 
microfinance is on the rise and will soon outstrip public funding as 
the major source of capital in the industry. 
B. The Microfinance Industry: The Demand for Private Capital 
The increased supply of private investment in microfinance is 
accompanied by increases in MFI demand for capital investment and 
entrepreneurial demand for microfinance services. This Section 
examines the diverse array of MFIs that compose the microfinance 
industry, focusing on the growth of the industry in recent years and 
MFIs’ increasing demand for private capital to fund their operations. 
It begins by looking at the overall worldwide demand for 
microfinance and the extent to which the microfinance industry 
meets the aggregate demand. This Section next discusses the nature 
of the current landscape of MFIs and the growth that the industry 
has recently experienced. Finally, this Section examines the recent 
and potential growth of MFI demand for private investment. 
1. Worldwide demand for microfinance 
Attempts to assess the total demand for microfinance typically 
begin with estimates of global poverty levels. The World Bank 
estimates that 2.8 billion people, or 560 million families, live on less 
than $2 per day purchasing power parity; among those, 1.2 billion 
people live on less than $1 per day.84 Fewer than 18% of these 2.8 
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billion people are estimated to have access to financial services.85 In 
developing countries, microenterprise represents the main source of 
jobs for the poor. Indeed, microenterprise consists of 80% of total 
enterprises, 50% of urban enterprises, and 20% of GNP for 
developing countries worldwide.86 
Investment estimates also indicate an enormous unmet financial 
demand. Practitioners estimate that the total amount of 
debt/deposit and equity funding necessary to meet the latent 
demand is $250 to $300 billion,87 while current total debt/deposit 
and equity funding of MFIs is roughly $17 billion,88 or 6% of the 
estimated demand. Furthermore, various demographic and economic 
conditions in developing countries, such as population growth, large 
proportions of youth, limited education and skills training, increased 
rural to urban migration, and an insufficient ability of the formal 
sector to absorb new workers suggest that the amount of potential 
microfinance clients worldwide will only continue to grow.89 
Despite the 133 million people reached thus far among the 
working poor,90 the microfinance industry still has a long way to go 
to close the gap between supply and demand. Current estimates of 
the total working poor who demand microfinance services range 
from about 1 to 1.5 billion people.91 Worldwide penetration rates 
imply that microfinance currently reaches 10% of its potential client 
base.92 Individuals located in China, India, and sub-Saharan Africa 
form the majority of those not reached by microfinance.93 A 2007 
study concluded that current penetration rates are no higher than 9% 
of the poor population for any given region of the world.94 These 
figures demonstrate the tremendous potential for growth in the 
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microfinance industry and, with it, the potential demand for 
increased funding from various sources. 
2. The current landscape of microfinance institutions 
The demand for funding within the microfinance industry 
depends on the ability of MFIs to achieve broad client outreach and 
profitability. Individual characteristics and the total number of MFIs 
worldwide are difficult to gauge because results have varied between 
studies. The different results are due to the varying number of MFIs 
that practitioners survey in any given study and the fact that data 
changes quickly as the industry rapidly grows. That said, estimates 
show that the current landscape of MFIs comprises of roughly 
10,000 institutions;95 these institutions exhibit a wide variety of 
levels of outreach and profitability. 
Microcredit Summit Campaign’s 2006 study collected data from 
3,316 MFIs, which serve over 133 million clients.96 It is one of the 
largest surveys of its kind, providing perhaps the most accurate 
picture of the current geographic distribution of MFIs. Of the 
participating MFIs, 1,677 were located in Asia and the Pacific (51%), 
970 in Sub-Saharan Africa (30%), 579 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (18%), and 30 in the Middle East and North Africa 
(1%).97 Another 2006 study, which collected data from 704 MFIs, 
found that their gross loan portfolio was $24 billion and that they 
had a combined total of $33 billion assets.98 In the course of funding 
their activities, the 704 MFIs reported that 65%99 of portfolio 
funding came from commercial sources, up from 40% in 2003.100 
The 20 largest MFIs of the 704 surveyed increased their aggregate 
gross loan portfolios by about 33% per year from 2003 to 2006.101 
This growth indicates a strong demand for private capital, which will 
likely increase. 
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3. Types of microfinance institutions 
MFIs range from non-profits to for-profit institutions. The 
majority of MFIs are non-profits and NGOs. However, the largest 
are for-profit institutions, which are often subject to banking 
regulations. Many MFIs start as NGOs and transform into for-profit 
corporations once they have grown sufficiently in terms of scale and 
operating efficiency.102 “Greenfield MFIs,” which have recently 
increased in number,103 are start-up MFIs founded as for-profit 
entities and from their inception attempt to emulate the best 
practices of successful for-profit MFIs. 104 
The industry is currently divided into four “tiers.” Tier 1, 
comprising 2% of MFIs, consists of mature, established, and 
regulated MFIs with strong financial and operational track records.105 
Tier 2, comprising 8% of MFIs, consists of successful, but smaller 
and younger MFIs that are at or near profitability.106 Although these 
are mostly NGOs, many may convert to for-profit organizations, 
thus progressing up to tier 1. A small percentage of pioneer 
institutions lead the industry, and the total investment demand of 
MFIs has traditionally been concentrated in these first two tiers.107 
Tier 3, comprising 20% of MFIs, consists of young organizations 
that are approaching profitability, but have shortcomings due to lack 
of capital.108 These are nearly all NGOs, some of which will progress 
to higher tiers. Tier 4, comprising 70% of MFIs, consists of a mix of 
unprofitable MFIs that are start-ups often in post-conflict settings, 
and weak financial institutions in regions where microfinance is not a 
priority.109 Some of these will progress to higher tiers.110 This 
division between tiers is reflected in the graph below. 
MFIs are frequently categorized by the number of borrowers. 
For example, the 2006 Microcredit Summit Campaign study of 
3,316 MFIs found 7 MFIs with 1 million or more borrowers, 54 
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MFIs with 100,000 to 999,999 borrowers, 313 MFIs with 10,000 
to 99,999 borrowers, 572 MFIs with 2,500 to 9,999 borrowers, and 
2,364 MFIs with fewer than 2,500 borrowers.111 These findings 
demonstrate the diversity of size among MFIs worldwide. 
An understanding of the current microfinance industry landscape 
guards against an unrealistic overestimation of the growth potential 
of MFIs. While the increasing interest and ability of MFIs to move 
down-market, consistent sector growth, and continued increase in 
the numbers of MFIs in all tiers demonstrate growing investment 
potential, complexities of the industry lead some to develop a skewed 
perspective. 
4. The funding of microfinance institutions 
Obtaining funding constitutes a principal challenge to MFI 
growth. Approximately $13 billion of the total debt/deposit and 
equity funding of MFIs comes from domestic sources, with $4 
billion from foreign investment.112 Although these funds are split 
equally between public investment from IFIs and private investment 
from MIVs,113 only “tier 1” and “tier 2” MFIs have demonstrated 
the ability to attract and absorb private funding.114 Indeed, private 
capital constitutes roughly 65% of portfolio funding for tier 1 and 
tier 2 MFIs,115 demonstrating the extent to which the demand for 
private capital will increase as MFIs progress to higher tiers. 
5. Growth of microfinance institutions and trends driving industry 
growth 
Microfinance institutions continue to grow in terms of scale and 
number throughout the developing world.116 MFIs served only 13.5 
million clients worldwide in 1997117 compared to 133 million clients 
by the end of 2006. 118 This is a growth rate in client outreach of 25–
30% annually.119 Excluding Ugandan MFIs, client outreach in 
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transforming MFIs increased by an average annual rate of 70%, while 
the median Greenfield MFI added 50% more clients.120As the 
numbers of MFIs and total outreach increase, the industry continues 
to mature and improve in performance. These trends accelerate 
growth. Efficiency, break-even rates, and leverage rates measure 
improvement and growth in the microfinance industry.121 
a. Efficiency. Efficiency is typically measured by operating 
expense. The Microfinance Information Exchange found that 
operating expense, as a proportion of average loan portfolio, 
decreased from 36.7% in 1999 to 21.5% in 2007.122 It is expected 
that MFIs will continue to realize improvements in efficiency.123 
b. Break-even rates. The “new generation” of MFIs, established 
in the last several years, has achieved profitability at increasingly 
faster rates. Time to reach profitability has decreased, on average, 
from 13 years for MFIs founded in the 1980s, to 9 years for those 
founded in the early 1990s, and to 4 years for those founded in the 
late 1990s.124 
c. Leverage ratios. Mature MFIs operating in relatively well-
functioning domestic markets have attracted funding from various 
sources, which has increased their financial leverage by replacing 
subsidized funding with savings and commercial debt. Median 
debt/equity ratios of MFIs are estimated to have increased from 1.1 
in 1999 to 1.9 in 2004.125 
These improvements in operational efficiency enable leading 
MFIs in countries such as Bolivia, Cambodia, Peru, Kenya and 
Uganda to become more profitable than their counterpart 
mainstream commercial banks.126 In countries where microfinance is 
most developed, various industry “enablers”—microfinance-driven 
entities such as credit bureaus and rating agencies, venture capital 
firms, research and training organizations, and technology 
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providers—are emerging and creating a more stable microfinance 
environment.127 
6. Demand for private investment and projections for growth in 
microfinance institutions 
MFI demand for private investment capital—not to be confused 
with micro-entrepreneurial demand for microfinance services—
depends not only upon the above-mentioned demand for 
microfinance services, but also upon individual MFIs’ ability to grow 
into profitable organizations serving a large client base. This growth 
makes them attractive candidates to receive and deploy private capital 
investment. 
For-profit MFIs have become increasingly profitable over the last 
several years, with median returns on equity rising from 14.3 in 2000 
to 23.1 in 2005.128 A study of seventy-one commercial MFIs found 
that between 2004 and 2006 total assets tripled, borrowers increased 
by 73%, and $435 million was added to total equity.129 Lending 
portfolios have also increased among mature MFIs by about 35% 
annually since 2001.130 Despite these advances, however, there is still 
room for improvement. Of the approximately 10,000 MFIs 
operating worldwide, only about 1,000 are profitable,131 and of those 
only 450 to 500 receive private investment from MIVs.132 
Profitable MFIs exhibit a growing demand for private capital. In 
2006, mature MFIs sourced 65% of their loan portfolios from 
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commercial funds,133 up from 40% in 2003.134 Continued increases in 
the ability to attract and absorb private capital can be expected. 
Within the next 5 years, commercial MFIs are estimated to reach 
$36 billion in outstanding loans to 23 million clients worldwide.135 
Additionally, over the next ten years, the microfinance industry is 
expected to grow ten-fold, serving more than 500 million clients 
with total assets of $200 to $300 billion, and requiring equity 
finances of $25–$30 billion.136 
The Small Enterprise Education and Promotion (SEEP) 
Network estimates that during the next few years, the absorptive 
capacity of the microfinance sector will exceed the available supply of 
commercial funding.137 Eventually, the ability of the industry to 
attract and deploy funds may increase to the point where capacity is 
sufficient to meet the overall global demand for microfinance services 
of 1 to 1.5 billion people by 2030.138 However, other analysts point 
to the comparatively still low percentage of tier 1 institutions and 
conclude that this limits MFI demand for private investment, 
keeping it below the supply offered by investors and preventing 
available capital from reaching unmet demand for microfinance 
services.139 
In short, both supply and demand for private investment in 
microfinance have grown tremendously in recent years. Indeed, 
practitioners anticipate ten-fold growth in the microfinance industry 
over the next ten years.140 Such an expansion would be a significant 
step towards reaching the 90% of demand for microfinance services 
that remains unmet. Ultimately, however, sustained investor interest 
will depend on the ability of the microfinance industry to continue 
expansion. Part III examines one of the principal challenges to such 
expansion, namely domestic regulatory environments. 
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III. REGULATORY CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT 
IN MICROFINANCE 
Whether private investment is able to bridge the gap between 
supply and demand in microfinance outreach depends in large part 
on the regulatory environment in which MFIs operate. A country’s 
regulatory environment can profoundly influence the ability of 
domestic MFIs to achieve growth and sustainability, and to obtain 
access to capital.141 A study issued by the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the World Bank concluded that a 
country’s microfinance industry cannot reach its full potential until 
MFIs are regulated and supervised in a coherent and prudent 
manner.142 
Regulatory regimes affect the level of opportunity for private 
investment in microfinance by facilitating or constraining the ability 
of MFIs and the microfinance sector to grow and develop. This 
influences the ability of large-scale mature and “investible” MFIs to 
emerge and increases the likelihood that lower tier MFIs will be able 
to become tier 1 institutions. Legal regimes also affect the 
attractiveness of investment in MFIs, potentially limiting the extent 
to which investors and foreign investors can invest in MFIs. 
This Part first discusses the most significant regulatory challenges 
to the growth and development of private investment in the 
microfinance industry, emphasizing the need for balance between 
protection and growth, and the importance of quality regulation that 
maximizes the two. It then examines how these challenges have 
shaped the microfinance industry in three countries: Brazil, China, 
and India. 
A. Important Regulatory Issues and the Need for a Prudent Balance 
As is the case for financial regulation in general, government 
officials regulating their country’s microfinance sector face the 
challenge of balancing the goals of minimizing risk and facilitating 
the transaction of business. These two goals can but do not always 
conflict. At one end of the spectrum, where there is very little 
regulation, risk is high due to insufficient barriers to entry into the 
market and inadequate supervision of market participants. This 
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regulatory environment limits growth and development because 
experienced investors and entrepreneurs refrain from transacting 
business as risk is high. Additional regulation furthers the goals of 
risk minimization and transaction facilitation. On the other end of 
the spectrum, heavy regulation decreases risk but increases the cost 
of compliance to investors and entrepreneurs, upon whom MFIs 
depend. This is especially true if these costs include foregone 
earnings from prohibited business activities. 
Microfinance regulators thus face the challenge of finding an 
appropriate balance between minimizing the risk to providers and 
consumers of microfinance services and tailoring regulatory 
intervention so that providers have the ability and incentive to 
sustain and grow operations. A proper enabling environment for 
microfinance can be established only where an adequate balance is 
achieved, thereby making it possible for a robust microfinance sector 
to develop with a proliferation of large and investible MFIs. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the issue is not simply a matter of how 
much regulation, but rather what kind of regulation is imposed. 
Regulations currently imposed on mainstream commercial banks will 
not suffice. Rather, an ideal regulatory environment will seek to 
tailor regulation to the unique nature of MFIs and the microfinance 
industry. 
The economic and financial events of 2008 further underscore 
the importance of regulatory reform carefully tailored to the specific 
institutions and entities regulated. However, while recent events 
have demonstrated the grave risks of assuming excessive debt, it does 
not follow that debt and financial services should per se be limited to 
certain types of consumers. Rather, governments must carefully 
regulate against predation by comparing quantities and terms with 
ability to pay based on future earnings. Regulation, although 
necessary to prevent predation, must not deny the working poor 
access to the same kinds of financial services that have been essential 
to the economic security and well-being of those on higher 
economic rungs. 
This Section outlines the following six most crucial regulatory 
challenges and their impact on private investment: legal status, state 
subsidies, source of funds, restrictions on provision of financial 
services, prudential requirements, and interest rate controls. 
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1. Regulatory challenges 
a. Legal status. A legal and regulatory environment granting legal 
status to MFIs—including organizational registration and authority 
to conduct operations—is essential to any MFI. Legal status provides 
certainty for MFI entrepreneurs and confidence for their investors, 
while also introducing oversight and supervision that minimizes 
risk.143 Additionally, an MFI must comply with the standards of 
relevant supervisory institutions. While certain types of supervisory 
standards are essential to MFI stability, others, if excessively 
restrictive, can also be detrimental. 
b. State subsidies. The microfinance sector has traditionally been 
funded by public sources, including state subsidies. In the long-term, 
however, a persistence of public funds can provide disincentives for 
the innovation and improvements in operations that lead to growth, 
sustainability, and profitability. 
c. Source of funds. High transaction costs are inherent to 
microfinance given the small loan sizes, the amount of work done in 
rural areas, and the more “hands-on” approach with clients. MFIs 
must have access to a diverse source of funds to sustain and grow 
their operations. Because microfinance is not yet a particularly 
attractive investment to domestic investors, international debt and 
equity investment provides a much-needed avenue for vital capital 
infusions. 
Many countries, however, restrict the amount of debt and equity 
investment that MFIs may receive from international sources. These 
regulations aim to ensure that shareholders have the financial 
capacity and strategic commitment necessary to supply additional 
funds, building checks and balances into governance, and preventing 
bank “capture” by individual or group owners.144 One suggested 
solution for balancing between protection for MFIs and creating 
access to funding is to permit regulatory agencies to consider the 
particular characteristics of individual MFIs and their proposed 
investors and to approve external investment on a case-by-case 
basis.145 In general, any initiative to regulate sources of funding for 
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MFIs must keep in mind the importance of these funds for the 
viability of individual MFIs and of the sector as a whole. 
d. Restrictions on the provision of financial services. Restrictions on 
the types of financial services and products an MFI is allowed to offer 
can profoundly affect the business model and profitability of MFIs. 
Most successful MFIs have expanded their services from solely 
providing microcredit to offering traditional financial products like 
savings and insurance. Moreover, MFI loans have evolved from the 
original working capital loans for microenterprise to larger sums for 
housing and even education. Apart from widening clients’ access to 
this diverse range of financial services, these services can be essential 
to the business model and to the growth and development of the 
MFIs. 
Perhaps the most important and challenging aspect of this issue 
is the ability of MFIs to take deposits from or provide savings 
vehicles for their clients. When done successfully, deposit-taking 
provides poor micro-entrepreneurs with an essential service thought 
to be at least as important and beneficial as lending. According to 
CGAP and the World Bank, international best practices recommend 
that not all MFIs be permitted to take deposits, but rather that the 
ability to take deposits be allowed only for those that can 
demonstrate the capacity to do so.146 This means that an MFI must 
meet requirements that indicate an ability to manage its lending 
profitably enough to cover costs, including the additional overhead 
and administrative costs of taking deposits. In addition, regulators 
must ensure that an MFI’s account and loan tracking systems are 
reliable. 
e. Prudential requirements. Prudential requirements such as 
capital adequacy requirements serve the dual purposes of protecting 
the financial system as a whole and protecting the safety of the 
savings that individual customers deposit with the financial 
institution. Practitioners believe that while the first goal is crucial for 
large commercial banks in the traditional banking sector, it is not as 
relevant for the microfinance industry, which deals with smaller sums 
of money both individually and on aggregate levels.147 Even where 
microfinance reaches hundreds of thousands of clients, the sector 
seldom accounts for a large enough portion of financial assets for it 
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to pose any serious risk to a country’s overall banking and payments 
system. While it is certainly possible that the failure of a large MFI 
could be contagious for other institutions, it is assumed that the 
main rationale of prudential regulation for MFIs is to protect client 
savings.148 
Given the importance of capital adequacy requirements for 
deposit-taking MFIs, a further issue is the extent of these 
requirements. CGAP and the World Bank’s study of international 
best practices recommends that capital adequacy requirements for 
deposit-taking MFIs be stricter than those applied to traditional 
commercial banks.149 This is because MFIs exhibit greater portfolio 
volatility and can be harder to manage in comparison to large 
commercial banks. MFIs are more volatile because loans are often 
unsecured or undersecured.150 In addition, comparatively higher 
interest rates among MFIs means that a given level of loan 
delinquency will deplete capital more quickly than for a commercial 
bank. Loan delinquency of MFI borrowers can also diminish client 
perception of the MFI’s ability to make further loans, introducing 
increased potential for outbreaks of delinquency. 
MFIs can also be more difficult to manage than commercial 
banks. Management and staff tend to be relatively inexperienced 
because microfinance is a relatively new industry and most MFIs are 
young organizations.151 Ultimately, best practices favor higher capital 
adequacy requirements for MFIs in comparison to commercial 
banks, at least until performance demonstrates that MFIs can 
adequately manage the risks and challenges of the industry. 
Minimum capital requirements for MFIs present another issue. 
These requirements are decreasingly seen as a safety measure and are 
principally thought of as a way to limit the number of financial 
institutions that enter the market and are supervised by regulatory 
authorities.152 These requirements effectively prevent agencies with 
limited resources from becoming overwhelmed by the number of 
new institutions. However, regulators should not set minimum 
capital requirements so high as to deter a large number of the 
socially motivated investors who are willing and able to finance 
MFIs. 
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While a high level of regulation in the area of capital adequacy 
reduces the return on equity and confers a competitive advantage 
upon commercial banks, MFIs can recover much of the loss of 
potential profits by charging higher interest rates. The demand in the 
microfinance sector creates a market less sensitive to interest rates 
compared to the traditional banking sector. 
f. Interest rate controls. The interest rate charged by microfinance 
institutions is a complicated issue because of the conflict between 
nonprofit and for-profit aspects of microfinance. While higher 
interest rates raise the cost of capital for clients, the interest capital is 
crucial for MFIs to cover expenses, achieve sustainability, and 
increase client base.153 
Despite these concerns, microfinance interest rates are an easy 
target for politicians eager to be champions for the poor. Political 
whims may impact interest rates and the ability of MFIs to pursue 
flexible sustainability strategies. Neither state legislatures nor the 
general public tend to understand the dynamic of interest rates in the 
microfinance industry; some have even expressed disapproval of MFI 
interest rates in instances where rates reflect neither inefficiency nor 
excessive profits. Government-imposed rate caps on MFI interest 
rates pose an obstacle to MFI viability. Practitioners generally agree 
that interest rate caps almost always hurt the poor far more than they 
help, as lower rates limit the number of borrowers MFIs can serve, 
thereby limiting access to microfinance services.154 
Some legislatures have introduced interest rate controls in 
response to abusive lending and loan collection practices from 
certain MFIs.155 A relevant concern is the over-indebtedness of 
microfinance clients resulting from lenders who issue loans without 
sufficiently investigating the capacity of borrowers to repay. This can 
lead to or exacerbate abusive collection practices. While microfinance 
clients must be protected from abusive practices, interest rate 
controls seem a counterproductive means of achieving such 
protection. 
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2. Striking the proper balance 
In an attempt to balance risk with business opportunity, 
regulations that err excessively on the side of overregulation or 
simply apply generic commercial banking regulations to MFIs, place 
unnecessary limitations on microfinance outreach. An inquiry into 
regulatory reform must consider not only the presence of over- or 
under-regulation but also the quality of specific regulatory policies. 
In many instances, regulatory reform can best be achieved by 
adapting existing laws to the microfinance industry rather than by 
deregulation. A regulatory approach focusing on quality, protection, 
and growth would foster a robust microfinance sector, thereby 
maximizing access to safe, formal, and sustainable financial services. 
Poor micro-entrepreneurs demand access to capital and other 
financial services. They pay local moneylenders dramatically higher 
interest rates than those typically charged by unregulated MFIs. 
Additionally, they pursue informal savings methods such as hiding 
currency under their mattresses, investing in livestock and building 
materials, or participating in local savings and credit clubs—activities 
far more risky than pursuing formal savings even in an unregulated 
financial institution.156 
Restricting access to microfinance services thus indirectly 
increases the risks to borrowers and depositors by limiting their 
options to existing, often riskier sources. This dynamic underscores 
the need to strike a balance and ensure that regulations intended to 
achieve safety and risk minimization do not unnecessarily restrict 
access to the safest financial services available. 
B. Microfinance Industry and Regulation in Brazil, China, and India 
With these considerations in mind, the following subsections 
discuss the regulatory environments for microfinance in Brazil, 
China, and India—highly populated countries with relatively low 
microfinance penetration rates among their working poor. 
Significant demand for microfinance services exists within each 
country. Demand for microfinance services, as a percentage of 
national population, is estimated at 8% in Brazil, 30% in China, and 
25% in India.157 This demand remains grossly unmet.158 The chart 
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below, depicting the geographical breakdown of unmet worldwide 
demand, illustrates the importance of these three countries to the 
analysis of the unmet demand among potential microfinance clients. 
THE UNTAPPED DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The large gap between supply and demand in these three 
countries suggests a tremendous potential for growth of the 
microfinance industry. For each country, this Section analyzes the 
regulatory environment within which the microfinance industry 
operates and discusses the extent to which different aspects of 
microfinance regulation may challenge the industry in achieving 
growth and sustainability. 
1. Brazil’s experience in microfinance 
Statistical information about Brazil’s population and economy 
reveal a fertile ground for microfinance. Brazil is the world’s fifth 
most populous country,160 with the largest economy in Latin 
America and the ninth largest in the world.161 However, income 
inequality in Brazil is among the most severe, with 10% of the 
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population receiving roughly half of the total income.162 Thirty-one 
percent of the population lives below the poverty line163 giving Brazil 
the largest poor population in Latin America,164 and thus making it 
fertile ground for microfinance. This case study examines the 
relationship between an underdeveloped Brazilian microfinance 
sector, and some of the regulatory issues that complicate further 
development. 
a. The Brazilian microfinance industry. Since its inception, the 
Brazilian microfinance industry has struggled to reach its potential, 
currently serving roughly 3% of the estimated 15 million individuals 
in need of microfinance. After introducing Latin America’s first 
microfinance program in 1972,165 Brazil’s microfinance industry 
changed substantially in the late 1990s when a political movement 
placed microcredit at the center of civil society development.166 
While still leaving the demand vastly unmet, the regulatory reforms 
stemming from this movement made inroads in facilitating industry 
growth and access to private capital.167 However, recent efforts have 
not significantly increased outreach: the microfinance industry 
currently only serves 3% of the estimated 15 million micro-
entrepreneurs.168 
 (1) Types of institutions offering microfinance services. Both 
public and private institutions serve the demand for microfinance in 
Brazil. Legislation passed in 1999 created two distinct categories of 
private MFIs: SCMs (Sociedades de Crédito ao 
Microempreendedor), or Micro-entrepreneur Credit Companies, 
and OSCIPs (Organizaçãos da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público), 
or Public Interest Non-Profit Organizations. SCMs are for-profit 
financial entities regulated by the Central Bank of Brazil, while 
OSCIPs are unregulated nonprofit organizations. Currently, 
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approximately 180 SCMs and OSCIPs serve 350,000 clients.169 
Municipal banks have also provided nonprofit microfinance services 
since 2001. Likewise, commercial banks have become increasingly 
involved in microfinance since the early 2000s, as they must 
designate 2% of their deposits to microcredit, either through SCMs 
and OSCIPs or through direct loans to micro-entrepreneurs.170 The 
largest provider of microfinance is the state-owned development 
Banco do Nordeste, which created the MFI Crediamigo in 1997.171 
Crediamigo is responsible for 150,000 of the 500,000 total clients 
served by the Brazilian microfinance industry.172 
 (2) Growth of the microfinance industry. Despite the change 
in the regulatory landscape, growth among MFIs has been slow over 
the last several years. In terms of client outreach, leading MFIs grew 
at a rate of 14% per year from 2000 to 2005,173 while the total 
worldwide microfinance industry has grown 25–30% per year.174 
Additionally, in contrast to trends in other countries, none of the 
Brazilian nonprofit OSCIPs has recently transformed into regulated 
for-profit SCMs.175 Such transformation is a key component in the 
maturation of a country’s microfinance industry. 
Commercial banks are responsible for much of the growth of 
microfinance services in the traditional consumer finance sector, 
resulting largely from two legislative initiatives in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The first initiative allowed banks to establish banking 
correspondents that offered microcredit and savings in underserved 
locations.176 Fifty-seven private banks participated in this initiative, 
leading to the opening of 3 million savings accounts, while the 
number of municipalities without access to banking services dropped 
from 1,444 to 0.177 The second initiative created simplified deposit 
accounts, making it easier to conduct business with low-income 
clients. The first two years of this program saw the opening of 6 
million of these special accounts with over $100 million in loans 
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granted.178 
Despite these promising results, the efficacy of these bank 
programs in reaching the working poor is questionable, as most of 
the loans are estimated to have been lent to salaried employees, 
retirees, and others in the formal sector.179 Banks are apt to give 
loans to salaried employees whose employers typically pay them 
through the banks. Therefore, the banks are able to deduct loan 
repayments directly from the employee’s salary. These elements of 
certainty and extremely low transaction costs provide extra incentives 
for commercial banks to target salaried employees. The reluctance of 
commercial banks to put forth substantial effort to serve micro-
entrepreneurs is especially problematic for the microfinance industry 
because commercial banks are the only financial institutions in a 
position to provide comprehensive and sustainable microfinance 
services. 
b. Microfinance regulation in Brazil. While the regulatory 
reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s made it easier for MFIs to 
operate and grow their operations, the current regulatory regime is 
still overly restrictive and burdensome on the microfinance sector. 
For example, a 2002 report from the Brazilian National Bank for 
Social and Economic Development (BNDES) asserts that the legal 
environment presents a formidable obstacle to MFIs,180 and that 
individual regulations are substantial and “notorious for changing 
with dizzying frequency.”181 The discussion below focuses on some 
of the most important regulatory issues affecting the microfinance 
industry. 
 (1) Legal status. The 1999 legislation that created SCMs and 
OSCIPs allowed MFIs to formally operate and conduct activities 
with greater certainty and security. This improvement increased MFI 
investor confidence because Brazilian MFIs were required to 
complete a registration process to be established and to operate 
within the protection of the legal system.182 
The Central Bank of Brazil regulates SCMs and imposes 
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reporting requirements on a regular basis.183 SCMs are also subject 
to prudential requirements that the Central Bank can modify.184 
OSCIPs, however, are not subject to prudential regulation,185 but 
must meet reporting requirements under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Justice.186 This supervision further strengthens investor 
confidence in the MFI industry. However, there is concern that 
reporting requirements for SCMs may be excessive, at least in part, 
because document requirements for microloans exceed the 
requirements of other types of institutions such as OSCIPs and 
commercial banks.187 Additionally, the cost of regulation compliance 
is one of the four major regulatory challenges faced by MFIs that 
contribute to the slow growth of the sector.188 
 (2) State subsidies. The Brazilian government has been heavily 
involved in the microfinance industry over the last decade. Apart 
from operating the largest and most successful MFI in Crediamigo, 
the government also provides much of the financial support for 
private SCMs and OSCIPs via BNDES.189 
One downside of offering government financial support is that 
the constant stream of funds available from BNDES diminishes the 
incentive among MFIs to seek alternative sources of funding from 
commercial banks or private investors. Problems with BNDES 
funding have also reduced the ability of MFIs to operate efficiently. 
In addition to exhibiting slow approval cycles, BNDES is often late 
in disbursing committed funds,190 thereby causing liquidity problems 
and delays in MFI loan disbursement. Where expected funds are late 
or do not arrive at all, repayment problems arise as clients realize that 
MFIs are not a reliable source of funds.191 
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 (3) Source of funds. The Brazilian microfinance industry is 
over-reliant on public funding, though MFIs can also receive funds 
from commercial banks, donors, and private investors.192 SCMs may 
also access lines of credit from foreign or domestic financial 
institutions, while OSCIPs may not.193 Additionally, MFIs are not 
allowed to issue securities or to participate in the interbank deposit 
market, and OSCIPs are prohibited from accessing financial 
institution funds.194 
To reduce inflation, foreign investment in MFIs must be 
registered in advance with the Central Bank of Brazil and is subject 
to various and oft-changing restrictions, such as currency and interest 
rate restrictions.195 As a prudential regulatory measure, SCMs are also 
limited to a maximum debt to liquid assets ratio of five times, which 
reduces the size of possible investment, especially given the relatively 
small size of MFIs in Brazil.196 
Brazilian regulators are interested in developing private sector 
investment in MFIs. To this end, certain loans from BNDES require 
that SCMs match funds from private investors equaling one-third of 
the loan amount197 and have linked MIVs with Brazilian MFIs.198 
However, there is generally a low level of foreign investment in 
Brazilian MFIs. One BNDES report attributes this low level to 
limited opportunities within the microfinance sector (i.e., a lack of 
investible MFIs, a lack of familiarity with microfinance among 
investors, and a lack of a secondary market for shares).199 This report 
also notes the high cost of compliance associated with registering 
transactions with the Central Bank. An additional study issued by 
BNDES identifies that the prolonged registration process and 
currency restrictions may further discourage foreign investment in 
Brazilian MFIs.200 
While the lack of strong and investible MFIs appears to be the 
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principal factor limiting foreign investment interest in the Brazilian 
microfinance sector, restrictions on sources of funding clearly 
contribute to the inability of MFIs to grow. Although MFIs are 
seldom starved for funds, due to steady contributions from BNDES, 
a reliance on conditional public sector funds diminishes incentive to 
innovate and become institutions attractive to commercial 
investment. 
 (4) Restrictions on the provision of financial services. 
Restriction on the financial services and products an MFI may offer 
decreases the profitability of MFIs. For example, the only financial 
products SCMs may offer are microloans and guarantees.201 Thus, in 
addition to being unable to take deposits, SCMs are prohibited from 
offering many common services in Brazil, such as consumer loans, 
mortgage loans, pawn services, insurance services, and trocas de 
cheques.202 OSCIPs, on the other hand, may offer not only 
microloans and consumer loans, but trocas de cheques as well. 
However, OSCIPs are prohibited from offering savings, housing 
loans, insurance services, pawn services, and credit card services.203 
These restrictions severely limit MFIs’ ability to integrate a 
variety of useful services into their business model. Apart from 
competitively disadvantaging MFIs, as compared to commercial 
banks, these regulations decrease the attractiveness of MFIs as a 
viable option for micro-entrepreneurs. 
 (5) Prudential requirements. Regulations on capital 
requirements must balance the competing interests of ensuring a 
bank’s safety and using its capital to yield profits and attract private 
investors. Brazil’s policy of requiring relatively high capital adequacy 
for MFIs, while simultaneously prohibiting them from taking 
deposits, appears to err on the side of safety, potentially inhibiting 
MFI growth. The Brazilian Central Bank places prudential 
regulations only on SCMs, while OSCIPs have no prudential 
requirements.204 The minimum capital required for SCMs is 
legislated at 100,000 reais (about $60,000), with authority granted 
to the bank to adjust the rate.205 
 
 201. MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 165, at 41, 161. 
 202. Trocas de cheques are services offering immediate cashing of post-dated checks. 
 203. NICHTER ET AL., supra note 162, at 37; MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 165, at 163. 
 204. MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 165, at 41, 161. 
 205. Id. at 41. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
38 
Brazil is unique in Latin America as it prohibits deposit-taking 
but places capital adequacy requirements on MFIs. In addition, the 
capital adequacy requirements in Brazil are among the most 
stringent in the region. This practice contradicts the international 
best practices advocated by CGAP and the World Bank, which 
maintain that capital adequacy requirements are not necessary for 
MFIs that do not take deposits.206 Brazilian requirements thus place 
substantial limitations on the ability of SCMs to invest their capital in 
profitable activities, severely constraining their ability to pursue 
sustainability and growth.207 
Lastly, while OSCIPs lack prudential requirements, SCMs are 
limited in loan size to 10,000 reais (about $6,000) per client.208 One 
study criticizes this limitation, asserting that MFIs across Latin 
America have realized major efficiency gains through investing a 
portion of their portfolio in relatively wealthy clients and using the 
proceeds and transaction costs savings (from making fewer, larger 
loans) to cross-subsidize a larger amount of loans to especially poor 
clients.209 Conversely, a cap on loan size can cause MFIs to keep 
costs down by focusing on the relatively wealthy and avoiding the 
poorest potential clients. 
 (6) Interest rate controls. Interest rate controls on public 
funding inhibit the growth of MFIs. While SCMs and OSCIPs are 
exempt from Brazilian usury law, interest rate controls are placed on 
the MFIs as a condition of taking funds from BNDES, which is the 
MFIs’ primary source of funding.210 Interest rates on these funds are 
capped at 4% monthly for loans above 1,000 reais (about $600) and 
below 10,000 reais (about $6,000), while loans below 1,000 reais 
are limited to a 2% monthly interest rate.211 In contrast, it is 
estimated that monthly interest rates between 4 and 8% would be 
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necessary to simply break even.212 These restrictions make it difficult 
for MFIs to reach profitability.213 
 (7) Credit collection. Credit collection practices in Brazil also 
inhibit the growth of MFIs. SCMs and OSCIPs are subject to 
regulations under the Brazilian consumer protection code, in which 
soliciting payment before the loan is five days past is deemed 
harassment.214 This regulation is ill-suited to microfinance, as 
providers prefer to have a closer working relationship with borrowers 
than do traditional bankers. Additionally, this regulation may also 
lower willingness to loan or lead to higher scrutiny of potential 
borrowers.215 
 (8) Taxes. SCMs are subject to income tax and a levy on 
financial transactions, while OSCIPs are not.216 This preferential tax 
treatment may explain why OSCIPs in Brazil do not transform into 
SCMs.217 
 (9) Assessment of regulation. The regulatory limitations on 
MFIs have contributed to the slow growth of the microfinance 
sector and the lack of large, profitable, and investible MFIs. In 
contrast, commercial banks are more loosely regulated and therefore 
can provide more expansive financial services. Micro-entrepreneurs 
desire the services that commercial banks provide, but regulations 
prohibit MFIs from offering such expansive services. Thus, 
borrowers are restricted from access to services and MFIs are limited 
in their ability to grow through comprehensive and dynamic business 
models. 
One study by BNDES lists the following four reasons for the 
underdevelopment of the Brazilian microfinance industry: (1) 
macroeconomic conditions, such as inflation; (2) an excess of 
government subsidized loans of credit; (3) competition from a highly 
developed market for consumer credit, operated by commercial 
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banks and oriented towards low-income clients; and (4) an 
unfriendly legal and regulatory regime.218 This study identifies the 
principle legal obstacles as inability to take deposits, restrictions on 
financial services and products, and consumer protection laws (e.g., 
interest rate controls and credit collection rules).219 Another BNDES 
report similarly lists the four principal regulatory challenges to MFIs 
as prudential requirements, restrictions on financial services and 
products offered, interest rate controls, and total cost of 
regulation.220 Both studies cite the inability to offer commercial 
loans, consumer credit, and housing loans as the principal limitations 
on products offered by MFIs. 
Brazil’s microfinance industry faces many challenges in 
continuing growth. The regulatory environment, although not the 
only obstacle, presents a significant challenge as regulators have yet 
to achieve an ideal quantity and quality of regulation to maximize 
safety and growth. Additionally, private, for-profit MFIs face more 
government regulations than private, non-profit MFIs, which places 
for-profit MFIs at a competitive disadvantage, inhibits their growth, 
and inhibits the development of the microfinance industry generally 
in Brazil. 
2. China’s experience in microfinance 
With 1.3 billion inhabitants, China is the most populous country 
in the world.221 Its GDP of $7.04 trillion makes it the second largest 
economy in the world.222 Nevertheless, 10% of China’s population 
lives on less than $1 per day,223 and much of its poor live in rural 
areas.224 Roughly 75% of the population in these areas has no access 
to financial services.225 These figures suggest a large demand for 
microfinance in China. 
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a. The Chinese microfinance industry. One study estimates the 
Chinese demand for microfinance services at 350 million people.226 
Only 23% of this demand (or 80.5 million people) has been met.227 
State banks, state-owned postal banks, and rural credit cooperatives 
(RCCs) currently provide 95% of all microfinance services in China, 
with MFIs providing the rest.228 However, regulators are attempting 
to increase the role of MFIs, especially because MFIs have been the 
institutions most successful in achieving efficient and sustainable 
operations while also targeting poor farmers and micro-
entrepreneurs.229 
MFIs’ lack of legal status prohibits them from operating on a 
larger scale. They instead operate as informal institutions pursuant to 
special, often temporary, government licenses.230 Informality limits 
the number of established MFIs and creates difficulty for operating. 
Without a thriving MFI sector, formal financial institutions are the 
primary providers of microfinance services. However, these formal 
institutions have not demonstrated a willingness or an ability to 
target micro-entrepreneurs, nor have they shown sustainability. In 
light of this dilemma, the government has recently pursued initiatives 
designed to revitalize the microfinance sector, the current 
composition of which is described in further detail below.231 
 (1) Formal financial institutions. During the decades 
following the economic reforms of the late 1970s, the state-operated 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was the main provider of financial 
services to the rural economy.232 Until 1996, ABC also operated the 
rural credit cooperatives,233 which have branches in almost every 
township in rural China.234 Since RCCs were privatized, however, 
 
 226. Ehrbeck, supra note 7, at 2. 
 227. Id. 
 228. DiLeo & FitzHerbert, supra note 19, at 13. 
 229. See Nick Young, Capitalist Fillip for China’s New Socialist Countryside, 7 CHINA 
DEV. BRIEF, Feb.–Mar. 2007, at 9. 
 230. See, e.g., Du, supra note 223, at 6; Shen Minggao & Cheng Enjiang, Restructuring 
China’s Rural Financial System: Existing Approaches, Challenges and The Future of 
Microfinance, GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, Dec. 2004, at 24–26, 31. 
 231. See, e.g., Young,  supra note 229; Thorsten Giehler et al., Microcredit Companies 
and Village Banks – Competition or Pluralism, GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL 
COOPERATION / INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., 2007. 
 232. Shen & Cheng, supra note 230, at 8. 
 233. Id. at 9. 
 234. Kathleen Druschel, Microfinance in China: Building Sustainable Institutions and a 
Strong Industry (Fall 2002) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Am. Univ.) at 36 [hereinafter Building 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
42 
ABC has steadily withdrawn from rural lending operations, devoting 
an increasing proportion of loans to larger investments in urban 
areas.235 Only 10% of ABC’s lending currently originates from 
agricultural loans; much of these funds are allocated to larger 
farming units such as seed companies and marketing cooperatives.236 
Additionally, a large portion of ABC’s loans are allocated to wealthy, 
rural households with connections to important local officials.237 
Given the decline of ABC’s rural lending, RCCs are now the 
dominant provider of credit and microfinance services in rural 
China.238 After privatization in 1996, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) required RCCs to implement microfinance operations and 
provide loans to poor farmers and micro-entrepreneurs.239 While 
RCCs are private financial institutions, they are heavily subsidized by 
the PBC.240 There are approximately 35,000 RCCs operating in 
China, collectively providing 86% of China’s agricultural loans241 and 
reaching over 130 million clients.242 Although RCCs exhibit the 
largest outreach among rural loan providers, much of their activity 
does not reach poor farmers and micro-entrepreneurs. Middle-
income men are the most common clients,243 with parent institutions 
or real estate investment projects receiving a large proportion of 
lending.244 
In addition to their limited willingness and ability to assist poor 
farmers and micro-entrepreneurs, RCCs have been unable to 
demonstrate sustainability. In 2007, one third of RCCs were 
seriously indebted and another third neared insolvency, while those 
reporting profits were not lending to small borrowers.245 Thus, 
RCCs do not offer a solution to the problem of delivering financial 
services to poor farmers and micro-entrepreneurs. 
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Another problem has emerged as deposit-taking from ABC and 
RCCs have increased, while the ratio of total rural institutional loans 
to deposits has declined over the last decade.246 Rural institutional 
lending as a proportion of total rural deposits has fallen rapidly since 
1996, when ABC began withdrawing from rural activities.247 This 
disproportion not only highlights a large demand for rural credit 
(apparent from the increase in rural savings), but also demonstrates 
the method of taking deposit funds from the rural economy and 
channeling from the poor rural areas to the more developed urban 
areas. Thus, where capital is most needed, it is most scarce. This 
trend deprives rural areas of opportunities to invest their own money 
back into the growth of their economies. 
 (2) Microfinance institutions. MFIs are the most successful 
providers of rural credit in China because they are sustainable and 
target poor clients.248 As mentioned above, MFIs have no legal 
standing to conduct business and require special licenses from the 
government. Unlike RCCs and branches of ABC, MFIs are unable 
to take deposits from their clients. Instead, funds come almost 
entirely from donors, international NGOs, and IFIs.249 A group of 
researchers from the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences established the first MFI in 1993.250 By 
2004, there were approximately 200 county-level MFIs in various 
regions of China, predominantly located in very poor and remote 
Western areas.251 Given the difficulty of acquiring a license from the 
government and the challenges faced once an MFI has been licensed 
and established, MFIs have thus far been able to provide a level of 
outreach that is largely insignificant when compared to the overall 
demand for microfinance services. Indeed, one study estimates that 
MFIs in China currently meet only 1% of this demand.252 
 (3) New institutions. Responding to the failures of previous 
initiatives to deliver financial services to a significant number of the 
rural poor, the Chinese government recently created two new kinds 
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of financial institutions. The two new entities, Credit Only 
Companies (COCs) and Village Banks, are for-profit companies, 
funded entirely from the private sector.253 The hope is that these 
initiatives will reverse the monopoly of RCCs over rural financial 
services and lead to a competitive market that will attract private 
investment and foster efficiency and effective outreach. 
The PBC Credit created COCs in November 2005.254 These 
institutions provide only credit (i.e., no deposit-taking) to micro-
entrepreneurs and farmers in poor areas and are established when 
granted a license by the regional government.255 They first appeared 
in a pilot program, implemented in five provinces, with seven 
institutions established by 2007.256 One such institution, Microcred 
Nanchong, opened in Sichuan Province in 2006.257 Investors include 
microfinance-focused international investment company MicroCred 
SA of France, the IFC under the World Bank, German development 
bank KfW Bankengruppe, and the private insurance company 
American International Group (AIG).258 The institution plans to 
provide credit loans, secured loans, and mortgage loans and hopes to 
receive a special license to take deposits.259 
Similarly, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
created Village Banks in December 2006.260 Village Banks, however, 
are formal, private, deposit-taking financial institutions with limited 
geographic scope to operate in designated rural areas.261 Unlike 
COCs, Village Banks receive full banking licenses.262 As with COCs, 
though, market entry is still constrained as investors and 
entrepreneurs must first receive approval from the CBRC to establish 
Village Banks.263 The pilot program began in six provinces.264 By 
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April 2007, the CBRC had received twenty-one applications to 
establish village banks and approved fifteen.265 With the current 
problems of unwillingness to assist micro-entrepreneurs, low 
sustainability, and channeling of deposits from poor rural areas to 
more developed urban areas, these new initiatives are promising 
attempts to meet the demand in China. 
b. Microfinance regulation in China. While the recent creation of 
the COC and Village Bank pilot programs is certainly a step in the 
right direction, the Chinese microfinance sector still faces a 
challenging and inhospitable regulatory environment. Legal 
constraints on microfinance in China create the principal factor for 
the underdevelopment of the microfinance sector and its inability to 
access a greater portion of micro-entrepreneurs.266 The discussion 
below examines the specific legal issues that have constrained the 
ability of microfinance in China to achieve sustainability and scale. 
 (1) Legal status. Unlike RCCs, which have clear legal status as 
banking institutions in the formal financial sector, Chinese MFIs 
have no legal status. No formal procedures or regulations pertaining 
to MFIs in China currently exist.267 This is problematic because the 
presence of an enabling legal and regulatory environment necessarily 
begins with a clearly defined legal status. This status provides 
certainty, allowing MFIs to pursue bold business strategies and 
assure investors that the MFI operates under the protection of the 
law. 
Regulatory restraints force most MFIs in China to register as 
NGOs.268 However, China’s financial laws make it illegal for non-
financial institutions to supply any type of financial service.269 Thus, 
with no official standing, MFIs must negotiate ad hoc with local 
officials for legal standing to conduct business.270 While this provides 
MFIs with a modicum of legality, these arrangements can fluctuate 
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with changing political conditions, interpretations of relevant 
memoranda, and state intervention.271 
According to Du Xiaoshan, founder of the first Chinese MFI, the 
lack of legal status leads to the slow development and low quality of 
the microfinance sector.272 Without legal status, the government can 
shut down or significantly compromise MFI operations. Du 
highlights three results of this uncertainty: (1) it undermines client 
confidence in MFIs as a reliable source of credit, which can lead to 
lower repayment rates; (2) it makes attracting and retaining quality 
staff more difficult, especially where employment in secure 
government positions is the alternative; and (3) it makes attracting 
funds much more difficult because a lack of legal status means a lack 
of credibility as a safe investment.273 Thus, securing the legal status of 
MFIs is of utmost importance to the future success of China’s 
microfinance industry. 
To establish a COC, private investors must bid for a license from 
PBC.274 However, the CBRC does not formally recognize these 
institutions, leaving their legal status ambiguous and their regulatory 
framework generally determined on an ad hoc basis and by local 
government oversight.275 As in the case of MFIs, these uncertainties 
make it harder to develop any long-term strategy for conducting 
business or attracting different sources of capital. The result is that 
MFIs inevitably become more risk-averse to lending and outreach 
initiatives. 
Village Banks fall under the same regulatory schemes as formal 
financial institutions and possess full banking licenses from the 
CBRC.276 Thus, unlike COCs, they enjoy the security and stability of 
full legal status, allowing for long-term strategies and a wider range 
of capital. Therefore, until China recognizes MFIs and COCs as 
legal entities, Village Banks will likely continue to occupy this space 
as the leading providers of microfinance. 
 (2) State subsidies. China illustrates why experts in 
microfinance caution against heavy government involvement in the 
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provision of microfinance services.277 The heavily subsidized funding 
allocated to RCCs, with rates as low as 2%, has contributed greatly to 
the monopolistic position held by RCCs over the provision of rural 
credit. This, in turn, has forced the PBC to continually inject cash 
into RCCs to sustain them. This, however, diminishes the incentive 
of RCC management and staff to seek sustainability and 
profitability.278 RCC directors and staff often provide subsidized 
loans to their favorite enterprises and household clients and to the 
local government.279 Because MFIs, COCs, and Village Banks do not 
receive public funding, the subsidized funding and bailouts granted 
to RCCs from the PBC competitively disadvantage MFIs. For 
example, RCCs’ lower interest rates quash competition from 
MFIs.280 The difficulty of governmental reform clearly distorts the 
market for rural finance and crowds out private microfinance 
initiatives. 
 (3) Source of funds. RCCs are in the best position to access 
capital because they enjoy access both to deposits taken from clients 
and to PBC funding. In contrast, MFIs must rely on donor funding, 
international NGOs, and private investors. In terms of accessing 
foreign investment, the state government controls short-term 
external debt balances so that borrowing from abroad requires 
approval from the regulatory authorities, which then affects the 
financing terms of the transaction.281 
RCCs receive funding from deposits, the PBC, and international 
grants. However, they face intense competition for deposits from 
ABC and state-owned postal and savings banks, both of which 
operate large-scale deposit-taking operations in rural areas. Due to 
this competition, RCCs cannot finance loans with deposits alone, 
reinforcing their dependence on PBC funding and compromising 
incentives and abilities to serve significant numbers of working 
poor.282 
Limited funding options for traditional MFIs make it difficult to 
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replenish loan capital and achieve financial stability. MFIs neither 
take deposits from clients nor receive PBC or commercial bank 
financing. Instead, funding comes primarily from international 
donors, NGOs, and foreign investors.283 Furthermore, deviation 
from the mission of serving the poorest clients occurs because MFIs 
are incentivized to target middle-income households to remain 
financially viable. The clients of most MFIs have lower incomes than 
those of RCCs, but have higher incomes than the clients of informal 
lenders such as loan sharks, which further demonstrates the extent of 
unmet demand and its harmful consequences.284 
Because COCs receive funding from private investors and 
donations, and cannot take deposits or public funding,285 most 
COCs lend out the bulk of their start-up capital and encounter 
difficulties raising additional loan funds. Additionally, their 
ambiguous legal status and lack of formal recognition from the 
CBRC prevents borrowing from commercial banks.286 COCs do, 
however, have a clear and flexible ownership structure, to which the 
only significant limitation is a maximum of five shareholders, making 
these institutions relatively attractive to investors.287 
Although Village Banks are private, formal financial institutions 
licensed and regulated by the CBRC to take deposits and borrow 
from commercial banks, private foreign and domestic investors find 
Village Banks less attractive than MFIs because of their ownership 
rules.288 These rules require that existing commercial financial 
institutions, holding a 20% minimum of total shares, initiate new 
banks.289 Alternatively, individual non-bank shareholders are 
restricted to a maximum holding of 10%.290 This arrangement 
enables commercial banking institutions with business interests 
contrary to microfinance objectives to dominate Village Banks. 
Indeed, this requirement crowds out investors who are most 
interested in serving poor micro-entrepreneurs and requires the 
participation of primarily profit-focused investors. 
 
 283. Id.; Building Sustainable Institutions, supra note 234, at 89. 
 284. Cheng, supra note 224, at 12. 
 285. Young, supra note 229, at 7. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Giehler et al., supra note 231, at 10. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 4. 
 290. Id. at 10. 
WINTER 2008 Private Investment in Microfinance 
 49 
 (4) Restrictions on the provision of financial services. RCCs 
undoubtedly exhibit the most flexibility in terms of business 
operations. These institutions may take deposits, offer loans, issue 
bonds, and provide guarantees, insurance, and domestic payment 
services.291 However, RCCs have not been able to meet a significant 
portion of the demand for microfinance services among the working 
poor. This is due to the counterproductive incentive structure 
produced by the subsidy regime and the reality that RCCs engage in 
microfinance because of a government mandate rather than their 
own business model. In contrast, MFIs can generally offer only 
microloans and cannot take deposits. 
COCs are similarly limited. As with MFIs, COCs may only offer 
loans and cannot take deposits. They are confined by jurisdiction and 
the jurisdiction’s client base according to the granted license. 292 This 
makes it difficult to achieve scale and reduce costs.293 COCs are also 
subject to a maximum loan size of 100,000 yuan (nearly $14,000) 
and quotas earmarking 75–80% of loans for the agricultural sector.294 
These restrictions inhibit portfolios structured to best achieve 
sustainability. Both limitations obstruct the efforts of COCs to cross-
subsidize smaller loans with larger loans. 
Village Banks can take deposits from clients, thus widening their 
options in seeking sustainable sources of funding. However, Village 
Banks may only operate in one county, capping the potential client 
base and obstructing cost reduction and pursuit of sustainability and 
profitability through scale. 
 (5) Prudential requirements. There are no prudential 
requirements for traditional MFIs because they lack legal and 
regulatory recognition. However, COCs and Village Banks enjoy 
lower minimum capital requirements than previous limits placed on 
various types of RCCs, which should allow more investors to enter 
the microfinance market. The minimum capital requirement for 
COCs is around 100 million yuan, which is much less than that of 
commercial banks or cooperative financial institutions.295 
 
 291. Microfinance Gateway: Regulation Home Page: Comparative Database: China, 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/resource_centers/reg_sup/micro_reg/country/9/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 292. Id. at 3. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 10. 
 295. Young, supra note 229, at 7. The minimum capital requirement for commercial 
banks or cooperative financial institutions is typically 1 billion yuan, and 150–200 million 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
50 
The minimum capital requirement for Village Banks is set at 3 
million yuan for county levels and 1 million yuan for village and 
township levels.296 In contrast, Village Banks operating credit 
cooperatives have minimum capital requirements of 300,000 yuan at 
the township level and 100,000 yuan at the village level.297 Critics of 
the policy lacking prudential requirements argue that despite the 
lowered capital adequacy requirements, the 20% commercial bank 
ownership requirement will still deter new investors from entering 
the market. They argue that the low capital adequacy requirement 
will not incentivize commercial banks.298 
 (6) Interest rate controls. The PBC controls interest rates by 
establishing a base rate and providing the various institutions with 
different intervals across which they may vary their particular rates.299 
As of 2007, the base rate was roughly 6%.300 Interest rate controls 
particularly hinder MFIs because MFIs use interest rates to 
compensate for the higher transaction costs incurred from large 
numbers of small transactions, often to borrowers in remote areas. 
Caps on interest rates not only pose a challenge to the survival of 
MFIs, but also discourage lending to the poorest potential clients 
and provide a counterincentive for new MFIs to enter the market.301 
RCCs currently can lend at up to 1.3 times the base rate, a 
ceiling that makes it difficult for RCCs to achieve sustainability. 
According to Tang Min, Deputy Representative of the Asia 
Development Bank in China, RCCs generally lend at 9–10% 
annually, an unprofitable rate.302 Interest rate controls on RCCs thus 
frustrate their ability to become sustainable and profitable. 
Ad hoc licenses and the lack of regulatory status result in 
inconsistently applied MFI interest rates. Annual interest rates for 
MFIs are typically between 6% and 10%. One study reports that 
international standards for sustainable microfinance interest rates lie 
between 18% and 35%.303 During licensing negotiations, special 
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temporary permission is sometimes granted to charge higher interest 
rates, which various internationally funded pilot projects have 
charged.304 These initiatives have produced effective interest rates for 
sustainable MFIs in China between 14% and 17% annually.305 It 
appears that only those MFIs that can successfully negotiate for at 
least a 14% interest rate will have the means to achieve sustainability. 
COCs may charge interest at four times the statutory benchmark 
rate, a favorable policy that will assist COCs in achieving 
sustainability and profitability. This policy demonstrates the Chinese 
government’s progress in fostering a more hospitable regulatory 
environment for microfinance.306 
In contrast to the favorable rate cap placed on COCs, Village 
Banks can only charge interest at 2.3 times the base rate, which is 
insufficient to cover costs.307 The inconsistency in rate restrictions 
probably results from the participation of different regulatory 
bodies—COCs under the PBC and Village Banks under the CBRC. 
Interest rate controls on the various institutions can impede the 
sustainability and profitability of these institutions. Thus, 
coordinating standards established by the different regulatory bodies 
can provide consistency to all of the various institutions, which could 
strengthen the microfinance industry. 
 (7) Taxes. Practitioners cite high taxes as another barrier to 
achieving sustainability in the microfinance industry.308 Local 
governments have introduced high taxes and fees on RCCs because 
the central government will not allow them to go bankrupt. RCCs 
are subject to operating, income, transaction, business, and 
consumption taxes.309 Local governments, rather than the national 
government, also levy taxes on MFI operations, which further 
hinders business operations.310 National and local governments need 
to balance the amount of required taxes in order to allow these 
institutions the ability to achieve sustainable levels. 
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 (8) Assessment of regulation. Various practitioners cite the 
“repressive” regulatory environment for microfinance as the main 
obstacle in China’s microfinance development.311 Additional reform 
to create a more friendly and enabling framework for MFIs is 
necessary for microfinance in China to reach a significant portion of 
the unmet demand. Practitioners are optimistic that, should 
successful reforms and microfinance liberalization continue, there is 
tremendous potential for microfinance institutions to achieve scale 
and attract commercial investment in China.312 Among developing 
nations, China’s potential is especially strong given the large pool of 
domestic investors and the strength of the Chinese currency. 
However, for microfinance to succeed, the government must 
liberalize interest rates, eliminate subsidies that crowd out private 
investment and cause RCCs to crowd out private MFIs, and relax 
restrictions on financial services. 
The newly created MFI entities (i.e., COCs and Village Banks) 
represent positive change for microfinance. The entities’ regulatory 
structures show that regulators are becoming more realistic and 
attuned to the concerns of MFIs regarding interest rates and the 
need to attract funding from a variety of sources. Some criticize the 
fact that only a few new MFIs have been allowed to enter the 
provinces where pilot programs operate, arguing that this simply 
creates new monopolies.313 This lack of competition diminishes 
incentives to grow in terms of clients served, products offered, and 
overall quality of service. The reforms would thus better achieve their 
objective of fostering a competitive marketplace if entry into the 
market were available to a wider field of investors and entrepreneurs 
through government-granted licenses. 
Furthermore, COCs and Village Banks each have their own 
regulatory advantages and disadvantages in their relative capabilities 
to be sustainable and profitable. For example, COCs have much 
more flexible ownership restrictions than Village Banks, making 
COCs more attractive to foreign and domestic investors. COCs also 
have much more favorable interest rate restrictions than Village 
Banks. 
On the other hand, Village Banks enjoy the advantage of formal 
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banking licenses, clear legal status, and the ability to take deposits—
advantages not conferred on COCs. One study concluded that the 
more flexible interest rate caps and ownership regulations better 
position COCs to maintain viable operations than Village Banks.314 
However, this study also suggested the necessity of enacting new 
types of MFI entities that combine the advantages of COCs and 
Village Banks. COCs and Village Banks were created by different 
regulatory bodies, namely, the PBC and the CBRC, respectively, 
resulting in disparities in regulatory treatment. To achieve regulatory 
reform conducive to the growth and development of the 
microfinance sector, the PBC and CBRC must cooperate to shape a 
coherent regulatory framework. 
Despite their limitations, recent reforms indicate that both 
regulatory bodies are interested in revitalizing the microfinance 
sector.315 Although regulation is still inconsistent among the 
different types of institutions, many of the new regulations, such as 
interest rate liberalization and the ability to provide additional 
financial services, demonstrate that the legal regime is moving 
towards appropriate quantity and quality of regulation that 
maximizes both safety and growth. While there is still a large gap 
between the current regulatory framework and one friendly to 
microfinance, continuing reforms may transform the Chinese 
microfinance sector over the next several years. In the meantime, the 
industry remains heavily constrained in the ability to close the gap 
between supply and demand. 
3. India’s experience in microfinance 
With 1.15 billion inhabitants, India is the world’s second most 
populous country.316 With a GDP of $2.9 trillion, it has the world’s 
fourth largest economy.317 Approximately 25% of the population 
(300 million people) lives below the poverty line.318 The World Bank 
estimates that more than 87% of India’s poor does not have access to 
formal sources of credit, while informal sources charge interest rates 
ranging from 48% to 120%, or higher, per year.319 MFIs, by contrast, 
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charge interest rates ranging from 15% to 30% per year.320 A 2008 
report published by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) noted that only 27% of all farm-based 
households have access to formal sources of credit, and one-third of 
these households participate in the informal credit sector.321 It also 
noted that the Northeast, East, and Central regions of India exhibit 
the most pronounced exclusion from formal financial services.322 
a. The Indian microfinance industry. One study estimated the 
total demand for microfinance services in India to encompass 300 
million people.323 However, microfinance has only reached 30% of 
this demand.324 With the exception of ICICI bank, which 
collaborates with Indian MFIs, the traditional commercial banking 
sector has shown minimal interest in providing microfinance services, 
and thus nearly all microfinance is delivered by MFIs.325 The 
microfinance sector is concentrated in the southern states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala; Andhra Pradesh alone 
encompasses 50–70% of all microfinance activity.326 Most Indian 
MFIs are classified as either nonprofit MFIs (or NGO-MFIs), or for-
profit MFIs. Two fundamental differences in the characteristics of 
these two categories pertain to formal regulation and the ability to 
take deposits. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulates for-profit 
MFIs, which can obtain licenses to take deposits.327 No formal 
regulation exists for nonprofit MFIs, which cannot take deposits.328 
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 (1) Non-profit MFIs. There are over 150,000 cooperative 
banks in India,329 around 30,000 of which are dedicated to 
microfinance.330 While these MFIs make loans on an individual basis, 
about 70% of their activity consists of lending to “self-help groups” 
(SHGs) made up of several (typically 15–25) poor micro-
entrepreneurs.331 SHGs take out loans from the MFIs to then 
disburse throughout the group. Additionally, they pool their 
income, which they deposit with MFIs into a common fund from 
which they can borrow.332 A majority of the funding for this pooling 
comes from the public sector and donations. 
A Linkage program run by NABARD orchestrates much of the 
public funding, where NABARD refinances commercial banks’ loans 
to MFIs.333 The Linkage program began in 1992 and currently 
connects dozens of commercial banks and hundreds of regional and 
cooperative banks with MFIs, serving over 10 million families.334 
Societies and trusts also receive direct loans from NABARD and the 
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), another state-
run institution established to promote broader financial sector 
outreach.335 
While private commercial banks are generally not involved in the 
microfinance sector, one notable exception is ICICI bank.336 The 
second largest bank in India, ICICI became interested in 
microfinance because of the financial and social returns 
demonstrated by MFIs.337 ICICI utilizes a “partnership model” 
whereby it provides funds to various MFIs for their lending 
operations, with the MFIs functioning as agents for the bank.338 
Under this model, several hundred MFIs partner with ICICI, while 
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total lending operations reaches over 1 million clients.339 
A small percentage of Indian MFIs are registered as nonprofit 
companies under Section 25 of the Companies Act.340 The Act 
provides MFIs with the formal ownership and governance structure 
of a limited liability company while exempting them from many of 
the regulations placed on for-profit companies.341 These MFIs are 
more active on a larger scale than societies and trusts.342 In the last 
several years, ten society and trust MFIs have transformed into 
Section 25 Companies.343 These organizations have also participated 
in partnerships with ICICI.344 
 (2) For-profit microfinance institutions. There are over 
150,000 cooperative banks in India,345 around 30,000 of which are 
dedicated to microfinance.346 Cooperative banks facilitate the 
smaller-scale operations characteristic of microfinance institutions by 
allowing MFIs to enjoy the advantages within the mainstream 
financial sector without being subject to the regulations placed on 
larger banks.347 After trusts and societies, cooperative banks are the 
second most common form of MFI in terms of number of 
institutions.348 These banks are typically organized either as Urban 
Cooperative Banks (UCBs) or Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies 
(MACs). Partly due to the low barriers to entry and an ineffective 
regulatory regime,349 several cooperative banks have experienced 
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failures in recent years, and it is currently extremely difficult to 
obtain licenses from the RBI to establish new cooperative banks.350 
Non-Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs) have traditionally 
played an important role in the Indian financial sector by filling the 
gap between supply and demand among poorer clients and rural 
regions that large banks do not reach.351 NBFCs have lower barriers 
to entry and higher returns than mainstream commercial banks. 
They have therefore attracted many entrepreneurs.352 Currently over 
13,000 NBFCs operate in India, 20 of which are MFIs focused on 
microfinance activity.353 Despite being among the rarest institutional 
forms, NBFCs and Section 25 Companies account for 80% of 
microfinance outreach in India, both in terms of clients served354 and 
loan portfolios.355 
Until recently, NBFCs lacked registration or regulation 
requirements.356 This lack—including low barriers to entry and a lack 
of oversight—culminated in the failure of a number of NBFCs.357 
While registration and regulatory requirements are now in place, the 
RBI—given recent failures of NBFCs and cooperative banks—is 
reluctant to grant further licenses for NBFCs and is wary of the 
challenge of having to regulate the microfinance sector. Despite 
recent NBFC failures, NBFCs remain uniquely positioned to reach 
out to India’s rural poor.358 
b. Microfinance regulation in India. The regulatory environment 
remains one of the principal reasons why the Indian microfinance 
sector is predominately comprised of a large number of small NGO 
MFIs, each serving a relatively small clientele.359 Meanwhile, fewer 
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NBFCs, which are capable of serving large client bases, have 
emerged.360 Regulatory changes in the last several years, such as 
reforms regarding barriers to entry and sources of funding, have 
made the legal environment more favorable for MFIs and have 
encouraged both the growth of small MFIs and the founding of 
large MFIs.361 Despite these positive developments, the sector still 
faces many regulatory hurdles, such as restrictions on investment and 
disjointed regulation of the sector. Finally, the Indian Parliament is 
considering a new microfinance bill, which has received mixed 
reviews from commentators.362 
 (1) Legal status. From the Indian perspective, the options for 
legal status of MFIs influence the determination of the MFIs’ 
ownership, governance structure, and their business model.363 
Societies and trusts are legally registered organizations in which 
members are trustees of the organization’s property.364 As charitable 
organizations, societies and trusts are not regulated in microfinance 
operations, management, or governance.365 Nor are they under any 
prudential regulations, partly because they cannot take deposits.366 
While this structure provides low barriers to entry and 
organizational autonomy in pursuing charitable initiatives, increasing 
operations and attracting outside funding is difficult for MFIs.367 
These informal management and governance standards can result in 
inefficient management slowing MFI growth. Furthermore, the 
management structure undermines confidence among investors, 
which poses a challenge to mobilizing funds required for 
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expansion.368 Thus, transformation into larger institutions such as 
Section 25 companies or NBFCs is difficult to achieve.369 
Section 25 of the Companies Act allows for the establishment of 
nonprofit, limited liability companies, whose activities are restricted 
to charity or other social purposes.370 The RBI formally recognizes 
and regulates MFIs organized as Section 25 companies.371 However, 
these MFIs are exempt from many of the regulations placed on 
NBFCs and large commercial banks because of their small, nonprofit 
character and because they do not take deposits.372 
Registration under the Companies Act and supervision under the 
RBI places a higher barrier to entry on Section 25 companies. 
However, forming a Section 25 company adds legitimacy to the 
institution, given the more formal ownership and management 
structure under the Companies Act and the supervision of the 
RBI.373 Section 25 Companies are more attractive targets for 
investment than MFIs organized as societies and trusts.374 
Cooperative banks, including UCBs and MACs, are for-profit 
entities governed by members of the board, serving as 
beneficiaries.375 Because they are smaller entities and only allowed to 
take deposits from their borrowers,376 MACs are under minimal 
regulatory and supervisory requirements and are relatively easy to 
establish.377 The opposite is true for UCBs, which are subject to 
substantial regulation and supervision from both central and state 
governments.378 While the Registrar of Cooperative Societies 
conducts administrative aspects, such as managerial supervision 
within the state governments, the central government regulates and 
supervises banking operations through the RBI.379 The frequent 
 
 368. Id. at 13, 47. 
 369. While this is true, there are instances in which some nonprofit MFIs have 
transformed into large and profitable NBFCs Two examples are SHARE and SKS. Smith, 
supra note 319, at 5. 
 370. A Study of the Regulatory Environment, supra note 324, at 18. 
 371. Id. at 18–21. 
 372. Id. at 18–21, 48. 
 373. Id. 
 374. While this is true, private equity investment is essentially precluded due to the 
companies’ non-profit status. 
 375. A Study of the Regulatory Environment, supra note 324, at 49; CHANKOVA ET AL., 
supra note 325, at 9. 
 376. Id. at 39–42, 49. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 36, 50. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
60 
intersection of financial and administrative regulation has resulted in 
overlapping jurisdiction that has undermined effective regulation and 
supervision. Indeed, several studies have emphasized the dual control 
over cooperative banks as one of the primary reasons for the recent 
problems of the cooperative banking sector.380 
In general, current organizational structure and regulatory 
regimes have unfavorable implications for growth and development 
of cooperative MFIs. The structure of governance by beneficiaries is 
problematic, often consisting of thousands of voting members and 
annual general meetings that require member approval for 
management decisions.381 Such corporate governance problems 
combined with the lack of regulatory oversight placed on MACs will 
likely raise concerns from commercial investors. While RBI and state 
regulations placed on UCBs increase investor confidence, the recent 
problems in performance of UCBs and high barriers to entry for new 
institutions continue to pose problems. 
NBFCs must register with the RBI, which regulates activities 
such as compulsory credit ratings of deposit taking and prudential 
norms.382 RBI’s supervision, along with the formal and professional 
governance structure, create investor confidence and make NBFCs 
the most viable MFIs for attracting funds, achieving growth, and 
reaching sustainability. 
 (2) State subsidies. The Indian government has demonstrated 
an effort to assist in microfinance development through a number of 
relatively recent initiatives. For example, in 1982, the government 
established the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) to provide and regulate credit and 
promote the development of agriculture and small rural 
enterprises.383 In 1992, NABARD began its Linkage program, 
encouraging commercial banks to work with MFIs by refinancing 
bank loans to MFIs.384 Additionally, NABARD provides subsidized 
loans to MFIs.385 More recently, the central government created the 
Microfinance Development Fund, which allocated one billion rupees 
(about $25.3 million) to NABARD to finance skill development, 
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foster institutional support, and offer funding to MFIs for their 
loans.386 Since the establishment of the fund, the government has 
continued to provide additional funding to NABARD to promote 
microfinance.387 Similarly, the government established the Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) in 1990, specifically 
to promote the growth and sustainability of the microfinance 
sector.388 SIDBI provides subsidized loans and grants.389 While the 
central government provides subsidized funding to nonprofit MFIs, 
it does not offer the same support to NBFCs.390 
 (3) Source of funding. Indian MFIs’ inability to access large, 
diverse sources of funding largely inhibits large-scale growth of the 
industry.391 While bank loans comprise the majority of MFI 
funding,392 scaling up requires larger infusions of capital. The 
inability to mobilize deposits and challenges with accessing 
commercial investments are some of the regulatory factors behind 
the funding constraints of MFIs. While societies and trusts may 
access grants, government subsidies, and debt investment, they lack a 
formal ownership structure and therefore cannot take on equity 
investment,393 take deposits from the public, or collect savings from 
their clients.394 
While the government permits and awards tax-exempt status to 
foreign grants, they are subject to an application process involving 
registration and certain procedural requirements.395 As of 2005, 
nonprofit MFIs could access external commercial borrowing 
provided the MFI met certain conditions.396 These conditions 
included having a three-year successful credit history with a 
scheduled commercial bank and having a certificate of due diligence 
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indicating the “fit and proper” status of the board and managing 
committee.397 For nonprofit MFIs, the loan cap is $5 million per 
MFI per year.398 Low confidence from investors tempers the ability 
to assume debt investment.399 The government also mandates that 
foreign lenders either be a financial institution or provide banking 
references.400 
Section 25 companies may access grants under the same rules as 
societies and trusts, but they are not tax-exempt.401 Like their 
nonprofit counterparts, Section 25 companies cannot take 
deposits;402 however, they can access debt funding and are a more 
attractive option for investment than societies and trusts because of 
their formal ownership and governance structure.403 Section 25 
companies are not conducive to equity investment, however, because 
their nonprofit status prohibits them from declaring dividends404 and 
regulations limit the price at which owners can sell shares.405 
Cooperative banks may access grants on the same terms as 
Section 25 companies.406 Unlike the Section 25 companies, however, 
cooperative banks may take deposits—UCBs from the public and 
MACs from their members.407 Cooperative banks may also access 
external debt on the same terms as nonprofit MFIs, but without the 
$5 million per MFI per year limit.408 The strict regulations and 
formal governing structure surrounding UCBs, which MACs lack, 
appeal and give confidence to investors.409 While UCBs and MACs 
may access equity investments, recent difficulties in the cooperative 
banking industry may have damaged investor confidence.410 
NBFCs may access grants on the same terms as Section 25 
companies and Cooperative Banks.411 Like cooperative banks, 
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NBFCs may take deposits but are subject to certain requirements.412 
First, an NBFC must be in operation for two years and obtain an 
investment grade rating.413 This is challenging for MFIs because 
conventional credit agencies generally regard lending to poor and 
rural clients as inherently risky.414 Second, NBFCs must obtain a 
license to collect savings from the RBI, which traditionally denies 
requests in order to limit the amount of NBFCs that it must 
oversee.415 NBFCs can access external debt investment on the same 
terms as cooperative banks.416 However, below-market interest rate 
ceilings on external commercial borrowing effectively prohibit 
NBFCs from obtaining cross-border loans.417 
NBFCs may access equity investment under the restrictions 
imposed by foreign direct investment rules, which vary according to 
investment size. To acquire up to 51% of the equity of an MFI, the 
minimum up-front investment is $500,000.418 To acquire more than 
51% and up to 75%, the minimum investment is $5 million up-
front.419 To acquire more than 75% and up to 100%, the minimum 
investment is $50 million, of which $7.5 million up must be up-
front and the remainder must be provided within 24 months of the 
initial investment.420 This effectively prohibits foreign equity 
investment in NBFCs.421 NABARD recommends lowering the 
$500,000 minimum investment requirement for 51% of equity to 
$100,000 so that MFIs can feasibly access equity and a broader 
range of investors can participate.422 
Regulatory barriers aside, NBFCs’ strict regulatory and 
ownership structures, along with their relatively superior 
management quality, make them the preferred option for both debt 
and equity investors in the microfinance sector.423 
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 (4) Prudential requirements. While the Indian government 
imposes several prudential requirements on MFIs, these 
requirements vastly differ among organizations. For example, as 
charitable organizations not recognized by the banking sector, 
societies and trusts lack any significant regulatory or prudential 
requirements, such as capital adequacy and minimum 
capitalization.424 Their nonprofit counterparts, Section 25 
companies, are unregistered with the RBI and subject to few 
regulatory requirements.425 However, they are subject to loan size 
limits of 50,000 rupees (about $1,064) for working capital loans and 
125,000 rupees (about $2,659) for housing loans.426 
Although to a lesser degree, UCBs are subject to similar 
prudential requirements as NBFCs. UCBs’ minimum capital 
requirement is Net Owned Funds (NOF)427 of about $2,127, which 
is about 200 times less than the requirement of roughly $425,531 
for NBFCs. 428 This requirement is a low limit for minimum 
capital.429 The capital adequacy requirement for cooperative banks is 
10%.430 In contrast to UCBs, MACs are loosely regulated and lack 
capital adequacy and minimum capital requirements.431 
The RBI prescribes prudential and compliance norms for all 
NBFCs, but the prudential norms only apply to NBFCs that engage 
in deposit-taking.432 Because it is difficult to mobilize large amounts 
of funds,433 minimum capital regulations are high—NOF of 2 
crores.434 The requirement was previously 25 lakhs (.25 crores) and 
rose in 1999 following NBFC bank failures.435 This new limit 
 
 424. Id. at 57. 
 425. Id. at 20. 
 426. Id. 
 427. NOF is defined as shareholder equity plus internally generated reserves. Id at 22. 
 428. Id. at 57. 
 429. Id. at 50. 
 430. Id. at 57. 
 431. Id. at 42, 57. 
 432. Id. at 22. 
 433. Id. at 32. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. (“Many such companies have been unable to service their debt obligations due 
to ineffective asset-liability matching and spectacular collapses like CRB Caps in Ahmedabad 
and Century Consultants in Lucknow have resulted in considerable loss of public confidence in 
NBFCs’ services. Recognizing the importance of NBFCs in the Indian financial sector and 
with the objective of integrating these with the financial mainstream, RBI started to regulate 
them from 1996. These measures include mandatory registration of companies offering 
financial services with the RBI, compulsory credit rating of deposit taking NBFCs and 
WINTER 2008 Private Investment in Microfinance 
 65 
impedes the establishment of new NBFCs and the transformation of 
MFIs into NBFCs. In addition, the capital adequacy requirement for 
NBFCs is 12%, compared to 10% for commercial banks.436 NBFCs 
also have loan size limits as a percentage of their NOF, with caps of 
15% of NOF for loans to a single borrower and 25% of NOF for 
loans to a single group of borrowers.437 Furthermore, NBFCs are 
subject to extensive investment restrictions and substantial reporting 
and accounting requirements.438 These steep management and 
governance-related requirements likely contribute to NBFCs’ status 
as the most attractive MFIs to investors. 
 (5) Interest rate controls. Private MFIs including NBFCs, 
Section 25 Companies, and Cooperative Banks are not subject to 
interest rate controls under RBI regulation.439 While state and local 
governments enact their own usury laws, the central bank regulates 
private MFIs.440 However, NGO MFIs, such as societies and trusts, 
may be subject to usury laws and other state legislation that allow 
state governments to introduce interest rate caps,441 thereby limiting 
the potential for abuse. For instance, one study in India found 
effective interest rates on MFI loans were 15–24% per year, while 
effective rates on loans from moneylenders, landlords, and traders 
were 48–150% per year.442 
 (6) Assessment of regulation. The lack of an enabling 
regulatory environment is a principal reason why more MFIs have 
not achieved larger scale and why the microfinance sector in India 
has only been able to reach 30% of the estimated demand.443 The 
disjointed nature of the regulatory environment, coupled with an 
inability to access various sources of funding, inhibit the growth and 
sustainability of Indian MFIs.444 Vikram Akula, founder and 
chairman of the Indian MFI SKS, believes that “the regulatory 
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environment created by the RBI is unfavorable for the growth and 
proliferation of microfinance in India.” 445 
The inability of MFIs to access various sources of funding is 
closely related to the regulatory regime within which MFIs operate. 
Depending on their structural limitations, different types of MFIs 
face varying degrees of difficulty in scaling up. While some MFIs are 
well suited to progress, others lack sufficient access to funds. 
Specifically, societies and trusts may be inherently inhibited in their 
efforts to scale up446 because they cannot take deposits, they have an 
informal institutional structure, and they are unattractive to investors 
because of instances of ineffective management.447 Section 25 
companies and cooperative banks are better positioned to increase 
scale and outreach than society and trust MFIs.448 However, they too 
face substantial challenges in their efforts to raise the funding 
necessary to achieve growth. For example, Section 25 companies 
cannot raise funds by taking deposits and declaring dividends, 
making them less attractive to equity investors.449 Meanwhile, 
though cooperative banks may take deposits, investor confidence in 
UCBs might be unstable given the current state of the cooperative 
banking sector.450 MACs are less attractive targets for investments 
given their more informal governance and lack of regulatory 
requirements.451 These factors reduce the attractiveness of 
cooperative banks for equity investors, which may ultimately lead to 
leverage problems.452 
Therefore, NBFCs are the MFIs best positioned to achieve 
growth and scale. However, to attain NBFC status, new NBFCs 
must overcome steep establishment barriers and existing MFIs must 
overcome steep transformation barriers.453 Additionally, regulatory 
obstacles to foreign equity and debt investment454 nearly eliminate 
 
 445. See WANCHOO, supra note 359. 
 446. A Study of the Regulatory Environment, supra note 324, at 13, 17, 47–48. 
 447. Id. at 50. 
 448. Id. 47–50. 
 449. Id. at 50. 
 450. Id. at 47, 50. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. at 50. 
 453. Id. at 47–49. Barriers are in terms of legal requirements (both administrative (ex: 
registration) and substantive (ex: regulatory requirements), as well as access to funding.  The 
information under “Governance” and “Scaling up of operations” in the chart on pages 48 to 
49 of the study are also relevant. 
 454. CHANKOVA ET AL., supra note 325, at 14, 18. 
WINTER 2008 Private Investment in Microfinance 
 67 
foreign investment in NBFCs.455 The only viable option for NBFC’s 
to find funding is to solicit foreign investors to guarantee domestic 
bank loans to local MFIs.456 However, transaction costs for loan 
guarantees are much higher than they are for direct lending and 
investment.457 Higher transaction costs dampen investment interest 
in loan guarantees, leaving the public sector and IFIs as the primary 
investors in loan guarantees. Thus, although interest in microfinance 
investment among the private sector is comparatively smaller than 
that of international investors and MIVs, NBFCs are often forced to 
resort to domestic sources to access funds. Furthermore, private 
lenders are crowded out of the market by commercial banks that are 
required to provide loans to low-income recipients including 
MFIs.458 This creates downward pressure on interest rates to MFIs 
and further limits participation of commercial lenders.459 
Another concern for growth and sustainability is that the lack of 
a comprehensive, clear, and uniform regulatory system.460 NABARD 
has recommended that the RBI centralize microfinance regulation 
under a single mechanism that regulates all MFIs in a coherent 
manner.461 A single regulatory body could remedy many of the 
inconsistencies in regulation. This would also enable the 
standardization of financial disclosures based on international best 
practices, across MFIs of all types, which would substantially reduce 
transaction costs and thus attract more investors and donors.462 
 (7) Proposed microfinance legislation. The Indian Parliament 
introduced the Micro Financial Sector (Development Regulation) 
Bill (the Bill) in March 2007 to promote the development of 
microfinance through new regulations and supervisory requirements 
for society and trust MFIs administered by NABARD. 463 Under the 
Bill, societies and trusts would be required to register with NABARD 
and comply with regular reporting requirements, including 
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submitting audited financial statements.464 The Bill also introduces 
procedures for dispute settlement between MFIs and their clients 
and details procedures for inspections of MFIs whose practices may 
constitute harassment.465 
Most controversially, the Bill would allow societies and trusts to 
take deposits from their members upon meeting certain 
requirements.466 To be eligible to take deposits, a society or trust 
would have to exist for three years and have a minimum 
capitalization of NOF 1 lakh (about $2,127).467 The Bill would also 
require deposit-taking societies and trusts to create a reserve fund by 
transferring a minimum of 15% per year of their net profits from 
savings and microfinance services.468 
Some perceive the Bill as providing a means for MFIs to access a 
wider range of funding for their operations, enabling them to 
broaden their outreach and offer their local expertise to a wider 
range of clients.469 From this perspective, MFIs would have a greater 
opportunity for increased client outreach, which provides a needed 
alternative for those currently dependent on riskier lending at higher 
rates from informal sources. 
However, allowing small and relatively informal and 
inexperienced MFIs to take deposits may put poor clients’ money at 
risk. The lower level of protection for clients’ savings in comparison 
to NBRCs has been criticized,470 although the proposed minimum 
capital requirement for MFIs is the same as that currently in place for 
cooperative banks.471 From this perspective, the current regime in 
which NBFCs and the formal banking sector offer experienced 
management and adequate protection, while NGOs serve as 
facilitators, is preferable to the arrangement in the proposed 
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legislation, which would dilute the safety of client deposits.472 
Prudential norms have been criticized as inadequate for deposit-
taking MFIs.473 One report argues that the mandatory reserve fund, 
as the single prudential regulation, will be ineffective for MFIs not 
realizing profits, and that it is necessary to limit the volume of 
deposits an MFI can take.474 Practitioners stress the necessity of 
prudential norms for deposit-taking MFIs, citing the importance of 
stricter capital adequacy requirements at the inception of an MFI’s 
deposit-taking operations.475 New legislation enabling MFIs to take 
deposits should impose prudential supervision through capital 
adequacy requirements in order to provide protection of client 
savings in conformity with international best practices. 
Practitioners recommend that MFIs demonstrate their ability to 
manage their lending profitably before they are given permission to 
take deposits.476 Regulators are thus encouraged to set criteria and 
requirements, the satisfaction of which would ensure that a bank 
covers its costs such as the additional financial and administrative 
costs of taking deposits. From this perspective, the requirement of 
three years of experience as an MFI appears promising. 
Commentators have highlighted the registration, reporting, and 
audit requirements of the Bill as measures that will improve 
management and increase professionalism across the sector.477 The 
provisions for inspection and dispute settlement are noted as 
important positive aspects of the proposed regulation.478 However, 
the Bill is criticized for neither addressing nor remedying the 
disjointed nature of microfinance regulation.479 The bifurcated 
regulatory structure inherent in the legislation requires the 
NABARD to regulate societies and trusts, whereas the RBI would 
continue to regulate NBFCs, cooperative banks, and Section 25 
companies. This runs counter to calls by NABARD and others to 
consolidate regulation of all MFIs under a single authority.480 One 
solution advocated by Sanjay Sinha, managing director of the India-
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based international microfinance rating agency M-CRIL, is that all 
MFIs be regulated by the RBI and thus “treated as an integral part 
of the financial system.”481 
There is also concern that giving NABARD oversight of societies 
and trusts may present a conflict of interest because NABARD is a 
key participant in the microfinance sector and provides equity capital 
and debt funding to society and trust MFIs. Criticism of the Bill has 
emphasized that combining the role of service provider and regulator 
is poor governance.482 Some have also taken issue with NABARD’s 
expertise and general capacity to regulate effectively.483 
The Bill also provides for loan size limits for societies and trusts 
equal to those placed on Section 25 companies: 50,000 rupees for 
working capital loans and 150,000 rupees for housing loans.484 
However, the Bill does not include an exemption for MFIs from 
state and local interest rate laws. This discrepancy could create an 
uneven playing field for MFIs relative to Section 25 companies, 
cooperative banks, and NBFCs, which charge cost-covering interest 
rates.485 Concern has also been raised as to whether societies and 
trusts are appropriate vehicles for providing microfinance services. 486 
This concern stems from society and trust MFIs’ relative lack of 
banking expertise and the transaction costs involved in the 
subsidized funding that MFIs receive from NABARD. 
Perhaps the pivotal component will be NABARD’s ability to 
prescribe additional norms that it deems necessary. The manner in 
which NABARD uses its regulatory power could determine the 
success of the regulatory program. On one hand, the implementation 
of capital adequacy requirements conforming to international best 
practices could provide much needed investor protection. On the 
other hand, if NABARD implements excessive prudential norms and 
regulation to appease its critics, the result could be an overly 
burdensome regulatory scheme. This, in turn, would reduce 
incentives for individuals and investors to start and grow MFIs and 
ultimately restrict access to financial services among micro-
entrepreneurs. 
Overall, the Bill has received mixed reviews. NABARD 
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commented that the Bill would help promote the growth of the 
Indian microfinance sector,487 while others assert that its positive 
features are “more than outweighed” by its deficiencies.488 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite recent expansion, the vast majority of worldwide 
demand for microfinance services remains unmet. New MFIs are 
emerging in all regions of the developing world, and existing MFIs 
are expanding client outreach to reach the vast unmet demand for 
financial services among the working poor. A small but growing 
number of MFIs worldwide have scaled up operations such that their 
profitability surpasses even that of local commercial banking 
institutions. These large MFIs transform lives by providing access to 
invaluable financial services—including credit, insurance, and 
savings—to those without access to traditional commercial providers. 
While the investment capital needed to create and expand MFIs 
has traditionally come from public and multilateral institutions, this 
funding has enabled MFIs to access only 10% of the estimated 
demand for microfinance services thus far. Fortunately, an increasing 
number of private investors, likely attracted by the opportunity to 
realize both financial and social returns, appear poised and ready to 
meet the demand for additional funding. Recent years have shown a 
growing number of investors pursue significant, innovative 
investment transactions and channel large amounts of much needed 
funding to promising MFIs. This trend further demonstrates the 
enormous potential for the private sector to work together with 
MFIs to reach a significant portion of the still unmet demand. 
Indeed, recent developments indicate that investors in the private 
sector will provide the necessary investment capital as long as MFIs 
continue to increase outreach into areas with unmet demand. 
To accomplish this outreach and obtain more private sector 
funding, MFIs need to achieve a sufficient level of sustainability and 
growth. While previous scholarship has provided an assessment of 
the percentage of MFIs that have thus far been able to do this, this 
Article analyzes some of the external factors that influence an MFI’s 
capability to become “investable.” An examination of the 
relationship between domestic regulatory environments and 
microfinance industry development, with specific case studies from 
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Brazil, China, and India demonstrates that domestic regulatory 
regimes profoundly influence the business model of MFIs and their 
capacity for growth and sustainability. 
The interplay between regulation and growth is particularly 
evident in these three countries, where the inability of microfinance 
to meet a significant portion of the demand is partially attributed to 
a cumbersome and disjointed regulatory environment. Because 
investors are unlikely to invest in MFIs that cannot show the 
potential to reach a large client base and achieve profitability, the 
stagnant growth of domestic microfinance limits MFI access to 
funding. The result is that, while private investors are interested in 
helping MFIs bridge the gap between current supply and total 
demand for microfinance services, they are restricted by the 
regulatory environment. This Article argues that regulatory 
environments constitute one of the biggest challenges to the 
development and sustainability of MFIs, and that a significant 
portion of demand for microfinance services will remain unreachable 
without regulatory reform. 
An essential goal for the microfinance movement is thus to work 
towards domestic regulatory reform reflecting quantity and quality of 
regulation that maximizing both safety and growth. In particular, 
NGOs, IFIs, and other microfinance-focused organizations must 
emphasize international regulatory best practices and encourage 
individual countries to foster coherent regulatory regimes tailored to 
the uniqueness of their economic and microfinance industry 
circumstances. 
One promising solution is for national governments to establish 
agencies within their banking authorities that focus specifically on 
the microfinance industry.489 Such an agency could cultivate an 
understanding of the unique attributes of the microfinance sector 
and work to integrate MFIs into the overall banking system through 
coherent and appropriate regulation. These agencies could also 
coordinate and exchange information with their foreign counterparts 
and microfinance experts at NGOs and international organizations 
such as the World Bank and CGAP. Such information sharing would 
disseminate expertise in microfinance regulation to government 
officials, helping them towards a domestic regulatory environment 
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that maximizes both safety and growth in the microfinance sector. 
Indeed, now that private sector investment is increasingly available 
for MFIs, the necessity of facilitative domestic legal environments 
may be the greatest and most important challenge for the 
microfinance movement to address as it seeks to close the demand 
gap and thereby dramatically reduce world poverty. 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ABC: Agricultural Bank of China 
AIG: American International Group 
BNDES: Bank for Social and Economic Development 
CBRC: China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CGAP: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
COC: Credit Only Company 
IFI: international financial institution 
MAC: Mutually Aided Cooperative Society 
MFI: microfinance institutions 
MIV: microfinance investment vehicle 
NABARD: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
NBFC: Non-Bank Financial Company 
NOF: Net Owned Finds 
PBC: People’s Bank of China 
OSCIP: Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público (Public 
Interest Non-Profit Company) 
RBI: Reserve Bank of India 
RCC: rural credit cooperative 
SCM: Sociedade de Crédito ao Microempreendedor 
(Microentrepreneur Credit) 
SEEP Network: Small Enterprise Education and Promotion 
Network 
SHG: self-help group 
SIDBI: Small Industries Development Bank of India 
UCB: Urban Cooperative Bank 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
